



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence.*

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. VI

FEBRUARY 1935

No. 2

DIVINE DISCIPLINE

Theories of modern psychology, and especially those propounded by psycho-analysts, on the subject of repression, are diametrically opposed to those we find taught in such books of life-discipline as the *Bhagavad-Gita* or the Buddha's *Dhammapada*. Far Eastern Lao Tzu and Confucius and Western adepts like Jesus and St. Paul, dealt with the subject of sense-control and self-discipline in a manner contrary to that which has been brought into vogue by Freud and others. To-day, suppression of evil tendencies, repression of vice, restraint of sense-instinct, arrest of sex impulses, are not generally regarded as sound and healthy for they are supposed to do violence to the human system. In the name of science the animal in man is allowed full sway, and therefore man cannot befriend the angel in him. The howling of the wild beast without drowns the still small voice of the angel within,

and in most cases "the songster mute and torpid sits, and of exhaustion dies". Large masses of people neglect to heed their own consciences, and find ways and means to indulge in animalism as natural to man.

Unless a reaction sets in, our civilization is bound to grow more and more corrupt until finally it becomes extinct. But signs are not wanting that such a reaction will set in. Thoughtful people everywhere are beginning to recognize the dangers of overpowering desires, and are advocating the necessity of discipline. The following article by our esteemed contributor, Professor A. R. Wadia of Mysore, makes out an excellent case in favour of discipline. A difficulty arises, however, by reason of the fact that people too often mistake asceticism for discipline. One important constituent of real discipline is avoidance of extremes—the neglect

the children away from religion," and called upon his country to deal with it or face disaster. We are no sponsors for the religion of the Communist, which makes him persecute the religion of others; but the record of the Churches during the war, and their numerous moves in these days are ominous. Are the opinions of the Churches sacrosanct or are they sufficiently subservient to conservatism and the *status quo*? Whatever be the reasons, we are confronted with the problem: Does the suppression of opinion viewed unfavourably by authority really effect its purpose, or only tend to drive it underground, to emerge later in a more deadly form? The press and publishers may be restricted by law as to what they say; scientists of the calibre of Mr. J. B. S. Haldane may not be allowed to broadcast—but what will it all effect? The only way to check undesirable propaganda is to put forward desirable propaganda. But what, in the opinion of those in authority, is desirable propaganda? Are we to understand that a vigorous anti-war campaign is not wished for? Then why permit the Churches a free voice? Can it be that those in authority do not regard the pronouncements of the Churches of as great weight as the opinions of the Press? Or can it be they think the organised religious bodies will be amenable to diplomatic compromise?

The Appeal of Aleister Crowley against the judgment of Mr. Justice Swift was dismissed by

three Lords Justices. During its hearing once again the difference between Black and White Magic was spoken of. Lord Justice Greer is thus reported:—

So far as I am concerned, I had never heard of the distinction between black magic and white magic until it was explained by the evidence as a technical distinction which is known to those who study magic and study the arts of people who either are or pretend to be magicians, black or white.

This is one more example of ignorance in high places of subjects vital to human welfare and progress. Magic as a Science is the knowledge of the constitution of Nature and of Man and their intimate relationship, and of the way by which the omnipotence of the human Spirit and its control over nature's forces may be acquired by the individual while still in the body. Magic, as an art, is the application of this knowledge in practice. Arcane knowledge misapplied, is sorcery; beneficently used, true magic or wisdom. The corner-stone of magic is an intimate practical knowledge of magnetism and electricity, their qualities, correlations, and potencies. Especially necessary is a familiarity with their effect in and upon the animal kingdom and man. To sum up: magic is spiritual wisdom; nature, the material ally, pupil and servant of the magician. One common vital principle pervades all things, and this is controllable by the perfected human will. The motive colours the quality of the magic and makes it White or Black.

of the body for the sake of the soul, or vice versa. Strange as it may seem, asceticism is twin to licence, and a man is apt to go from the one to the other. The Indian faquir who tortures his body for the good of his soul suffers from the same disease as the Occidental who indulges the senses believing that there is no soul, or that his consciousness is the product of his brains and blood and evaporates on the death of the body. Both classes suffer from a lack of correct knowledge concerning the make-up of man.

The constitution of man is very clearly explained in Asiatic psychology:—Mind is not only not the product of the brain, but is itself to be distinguished from the Thinker, the Soul, whose tool it is in reality. Thus self-consciousness is regarded as an entity which uses the mind. Similarly, the teaching about the human body and brain is different from that offered by modern physiology and biology. According to ancient Eastern science the body with its senses and organs rests on the foundations of a subtle form called in Sanskrit *Linga Sharira* (which means Design Body), and is so named because it provides the foundation-plan and the model on which the gross body is built. Its existence was recognized by many schools even in the Western world, as its names Doppelgänger, Perisprit, the Double, etc., signify. More generally it is known as the Astral Body—but that term has been loosely used in recent years causing confusion to many, among

whom is the novelist, Mr. William Gerhardt, who narrated his experience in the *Sunday Express* (London) a few weeks ago. He need not have been “nauseated” by the term “Astral,” because it does not imply the power to leave this earth and visit distant stars. The substance of which this *Linga Sharira* is composed has a starry luminosity of its own, hence the name “Astral”. Another name given to the *Linga Sharira* is that of the Personal Man, or Personality, since it forms the mask of the self-conscious thinker and of its tool, the mind. It becomes the playground of a double set of forces: (a) impressions received from the Universe *via* the senses and the brain, and (b) impressions received from within, from the self-conscious soul through its vehicle, the mind. Between this pair of duads exists the assemblage of desires, good and bad, which play the part of the angel or the devil in man.

An understanding of these constituents removes confusion and prevents a man from falling into the error either of tortuous asceticism or of sensuous indulgence. Putting the sure finger of knowledge on what is to be disciplined and on who is the disciplinarian, the student of Asiatic psychology seeks the method of discipline and finds important clues; here is such a clue offered by the *Gita*:—

For those enjoyments which arise through the contact of the senses with external objects are wombs of pain, since they have a beginning and an end; O son of Kunti, the wise man delighteth not in these. (V. 22)

Neither the senses nor the objects of sense hinder the attainment of happiness, but their contact—excessive or meagre, defective or disproportioned—does. Discipline does not consist in the torture of the fleshly senses nor in the hatred of worldly objects, but in the treatment of those longings which unite in wedlock incompatible entities, thus producing confusion and pain, leading to divorce. The ascetic blames the senses and starves them, the libertine indulges them; the former looks upon the worldly life as *maya*, the latter thinks it to be the only reality—and both go to excess. The verse from the *Gita* quoted above offers a clue to what is to be disciplined and, read in conjunction with the following verses, the student not only learns

the method of discipline but also learns who the Disciplinarian is.

This divine discipline, Arjuna, is not to be attained by the man who eateth more than enough or too little, nor by him who hath a habit of sleeping much, nor by him who is given to overwatching. The meditation which destroyeth pain is produced in him who is moderate in eating and in recreation, of moderate exertion in his actions, and regulated in sleeping and waking. When the man, so living, centres his heart in the true Self and is exempt from attachment to all desires, he is said to have attained to Yoga. (VI. 16-18)

The tranquillity of an enlightened heart, the peace of a controlled mind, the rhythmic activities of purified senses, are produced in man when he exercises himself according to these instructions, and only then is real happiness experienced.

HAPPINESS—DESIRE vs. DISCIPLINE

[A. R. Wadia, Professor of Philosophy of the Mysore University, is already known to our readers. In this article he deals in a practical manner with the false cult of Hedonism which is flourishing everywhere to-day.—Eds.]

There is a beautiful story of Buddha, in which it is told how a disconsolate mother implored him to bring back to life her dead child. Buddha in his graciousness offered to accede to her request provided she could bring him a mustard seed from a house where no loved one had ever died. It was not long before the mother realised the impossibility of her search, but she also learned something of far greater importance—the moral of the Enlightened One's unspoken parable. She realised,

as every other mortal has realised, that life is not a bed of roses. He who would search for unalloyed happiness is doomed to failure. We all know this, but there seems to be something in us which goads us on to hunt for pleasure. That is why Hedonism presents the paradox of being always killed yet ever living. Periods of great religious exaltation find people turning away from the delights of the senses, but a generation or two later finds the pendulum swinging to the other extreme. The eternal

conflict between the spirit of Puritanism and the spirit of Hedonism certainly brings out the fact that the desire for pleasure is an ingrained trait in human nature and it cannot be eradicated at the sweet will of the religious fanatic. Man has a right to pursue happiness. But what is happiness?

The naïve man seeks to be happy in the pursuit of his bodily desires just as naturally as children find it impossible to resist following all their wayward impulses. But man, as he grows, soon begins to realise that the unrestrained satisfaction of desires brings him into conflict with the rival wills of his neighbours; the great social lesson of give-and-take forcibly impresses itself upon him; and he comes to learn that happiness implies a curbing of his desires as much as their satisfaction. The primitive man with his untamed instinct chafes under restrictions, but for that very reason social taboos and the rigidity of customs are made all the stronger, for only through discipline can even a primitive community hope to survive in the struggle for existence against hostile tribes or the brute force of beasts. The primitive man is unable to differentiate between the wheat and the chaff, between what all individuals must be coerced to do and what may be left to the initiative of the individual. That is why primitive life has no distinguishable frontiers of custom, law, morality or religion. All are inextricably mixed up and the individual becomes a machine.

With civilization is born free-

dom. Morality comes to be distinguished from, though not necessarily separated from, religion. Law comes to have a sphere of its own, relaxing its hold on morality and religion, while what is merely customary is assigned a place of its own. Thus there is considerable room left for the native genius of an individual to assert itself in science and philosophy, art and religion. None of these could have had their long historic career without the breath of freedom. Freedom is often conceived to be in perpetual opposition to coercion as exercised by the powers that be, and that is why it has become usual with some to talk as if the essence of freedom were to be found in freedom from restraint. But this is only half a truth and like all half-truths it is dangerously misleading. Freedom in this sense comes very soon into conflict with the wills of others, and the thwarted individual begins to feel that he would be happy, if his will could have free play. But this is only a dream, for a man left to himself would soon sink to the level of the lonely beast. The humanity in him can flower only within the fostering bosom of a society, which by its very nature implies a restraint on the individual will. Herein lies the value of discipline. Herein lies the value of the paradox that a man can be his best only by expanding his ego so as to identify itself with the will of his society. Social will is impersonal, in that it is embodied in the old traditions and culture built up by previous generations, and

yet it is personal also, as it lives in the will of its individual members. It is living to the degree to which successive generations live up to its spirit, changing indeed as the needs of changing conditions demand and yet building the new on the old.

It is the iron law of history that only a society which is compact by reason of the loyal allegiance of its members can hold its own in its struggle to live; the society in which the social bond is loose and individualism rampant, is apt to go under. *Prima facie*, this is an argument for conservatism and every society must to a certain extent be conservative, for no man can begin the process of civilization: every man must imbibe all that the past has built up, ready to be used by whosoever has the will and the ability to use it. But mere conservatism has also got its dangers. In its extreme form it leads to a deification of the past. A living society, however, cannot afford to live only in the past. It has to face new situations and it must evolve new thoughts in order to understand new forces, and forge new instruments to succeed in its struggles. A society that fails to adapt itself to new situations is apt to go under.

A good deal of psychology and ethics in the past was vitiated by the fact that a man was looked upon as an entity in himself, whereas the real entity has all along been a society, big or small, of which an individual is merely a fraction. A child is born helpless, he is incomplete but finds comple-

tion to some extent in his parents. As he grows he finds more completion in his school and teachers, in his play-fellows and in the volumes that look down from the library shelves, eager to be read and digested, as selfless as the torch which can pass on its light to endless other torches. As he grows still more, vague yearnings fill him, his heart flutters at the approach of some being, he hungers to touch her and be touched by her, till in course of time they become one. He still grows in her and in course of time there emerges a concrete embodiment of the unity of his spouse and himself. Life becomes serious and makes demands on him for the satisfaction of the crying needs of three or more in one family unit. He has to confront lie and earn his bread, meet disappointments, face injustice, overcome calumny and hammer out life in some shape or other until he can work no more and can but look to the children of his loins to relieve him of his burdens. And finally there comes Yama and—the cycle begins again.

Look back on the whole life of a man. At what stage was he ever independent, independent in the sense that he could do what he liked, ride roughshod over all impediments, brush aside all with a ruthless hand? Not the mightiest man through the ages can claim to have been really independent. Alexander and Cæsar, Timur and Babar would have been helpless without their loyal cohorts. Kings cannot do without the loyalty of their subjects, and democracies

flourish only so long as there is discipline. Man as he grows becomes smaller in himself. Only a child can afford to be self-centred and day-dreaming. Wider interests crowd round him till he feels in himself his own nothingness. He may die an obscure man or admiring crowds may follow his bier, but the worth of his life can be measured only in terms of the question: has he left the world better than he found it in so far as it lay with him to make it better or worse?

Where is happiness? What niche does it occupy in the scheme of life? Carlyle with an almost savage intensity declaimed against the cult of happiness. What right has a man to be happy, he asked, and biology seems to echo his query. Let man live and achieve, and happiness will take care of itself, seems to be its advice. But man does not care to listen. Perhaps he is not so framed as to listen. That is why our contemporary world is lost in its feverish search for happiness. The votary of pleasure assures us it can be found in cocktail parties, in midnight dances, in laughing matrimony out of existence as a creed outworn. America claims to be morally advanced because it can show one divorce for every five marriages, and presumably the acme of perfection will be reached when there are as many divorces as there are marriages. Communistic Russia looks upon marriage as a mere matter of legal formality, which may or may not be gone through as the parties wish. It makes not the slightest

difference. Mr. Maurice Hindus has recorded the case of a Russian daughter describing her father as "a big muzhik with his red goatish beard and his beastly walk". A daughter of conservative India has written in bold print:—

Mensuck the blood of women as capitalists suck the blood of workers. In other words men ruin women by binding them with the chains of marriage. All these brothels are the result of the marriage shackles. If the marriage system is abolished and every man and woman is given freedom, no brothel can exist in the world.

And why this outcry against marriage? Because marriage in these modern days has been dissected by certain intellectual thinkers till nothing of its reality has remained, and ardent young girls and boys find the goal of happiness in a merry carnival of wine and dance. "Ah, take the cash and let the credit go," they seem to be repeating with old Omar. With Omar Khayyam it was a mood, born of shattered hopes and unsolved riddles of life and it just ended in a cry of despair: "Ah, take the cash and let the credit go." With our modern philosophers of happiness a mood has given place to a system nourished within the womb of freedom. But they too may yet have to learn that happiness cannot be so cheaply bought. Free love too has its aches and its disappointments. It too has claimed its toll in broken hopes and found its grave in the oblivion of suicide.

Can there be happiness without restraint? Which page of human history shows that man ever attained to it by doing as he liked?

Whatever freedom modern Russia may give in the realm of marriage, there is no country which is more disciplined so far as the basic principles of the Soviet cult are concerned. No Bolshevik dare indulge in luxuries or in mere gaieties. He cannot drink as much as he likes nor can he gamble, though there is precious little with which he can gamble. If his parents are bourgeois, he has to disown them and even change his name. Verily, this is the apotheosis of freedom, and right or wrong it is only because of this iron discipline that the Soviet Government has managed to hold its own with a ring of capitalistic countries circling it round. How long is this freedom in marriage and divorce to continue? Perhaps it is just a temporary swing of the pendulum, a reaction against the old rigour. In any case it is a bold attempt to grapple with the problem of brothels; but no solution can be real or lasting if they can be abolished only at the cost of converting each home into a brothel,

—and that is what free love implies. A generation surfeited with the excess of love may yet come to learn the elementary lesson of all history, that unadulterated happiness is not meant for man, and that he can hope to achieve some of it only through restraint. The first lesson of all morality, whether in the East or West, is the control of our impulses, *i. e.*, temperance. There can be no success in life except in so far as we subserve social ends, and success comes to those alone who have a disciplined will; and only to this limited extent can we mortals hope to be happy. It is a reward which will not come our way, if we make it the end-all and the be-all of our life. It may fall unsought into our lap through our consciousness that we have done our bit by holding steadfast to what we honestly believe to be right, and doing it in order to lighten the burden of injustice and oppression, to cheer the struggling, and to stand by the righteous.

A. R. WADIA

Do not believe that lust can ever be killed out if gratified or satiated, for this is an abomination inspired by Mara. It is by feeding vice that it expands and waxes strong, like to the worm that fattens on the blossom's heart.

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE.

THE CAUSE OF PEACE

MODERN FAILURE: ANCIENT ACHIEVEMENT

[Below we print two articles, the first of which examines the moral causes of the last great war and may well cause a future one. **John Bakeless** is a well-known American journalist who wrote in 1921 *The Economic Causes of Modern War* and in 1926 *The Origin of the Next War*; in this article he traces the root cause of wars to human passions and recommends the application of old religious formulas to the solution of the most pressing problem of this era. The second article by **Professor Radhakumud Mookerji** demonstrates how lasting peace was established by the great Buddhist Emperor Asoka. Modern statesmen and administrators are puny men compared to this Ruler who succeeded in India, 300 years before the Christian era; but these men lack the courage and vision, even to copy the example of one whom H. G. Wells called the world's greatest king.—EDS.]

I.—THE MORAL CAUSES OF WAR

To understand the problem which modern war presents, it is necessary to go behind historical superficialities and discern fundamental causes. All the wars of the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have resulted from economic forces. If we analyse the wars of the world from 1878 to 1918, we can trace them all to a series of causes intimately bound up with the industrial revolution. Population expands. Nations seek outlets for their surplus people; or else they seek raw materials and markets to support the crowded population at home; or they do both at once. Then they become nervous over the sea-lanes which link colonies and markets to the homeland and which have become vital to the national existence.

Nations proceed to build up their armaments, in quite good faith, for defence alone. But since defensive arms may also be used in attack, other nations take alarm. Armament races follow. A general atmosphere of hatred and suspicion

develops. Statesmen try to supplement the strength of their nations by establishing alliance. Their rivals, in further alarm, form counter-alliances. Each side watches the other with increased distrust, while the armaments makers, who profit from such a situation, help to make it worse. When the spark comes, in the form of some sensational incident which offends national pride, there is plenty of powder lying about.

A somewhat less dangerous cause of discord in the modern world is the existence of national minorities within alien states—Macedonian and Croatian minorities in Yugoslavia; Hungarian in Roumania; Italian in the French colony of Tunis; German in Czechoslovakia. The grievances of these minorities, some of which are cruelly abused by the governments which control them, are hardly to be regarded as fundamental war-causes, but they are fruitful sources of the kind of incidents which precipitate hostili-

ties after the more fundamental economic causes have produced acute international friction. In every case, people of the same blood in the adjacent homeland are stirred by the plight of their brethren on foreign soil and seek to alter the frontiers to bring them inside.

Even if these plans succeed, however, the situation is no better, for then a new national minority has been created. If the Germans in Czechoslovakia were reunited with Germany or Austria, there would then be a Czech minority in Germany. If the Hungarians in Roumania were brought back into Hungary, they would bring their Roumanian neighbours with them, to form a new and equally dissatisfied national minority.

Irredentism is thus a perpetual cause of international friction; but it would probably lead to nothing worse than small wars waged in a limited area, were the evil effects of such friction not extended by the alliances which are due to the economic causes just outlined. If these causes could be controlled, war would not be eliminated, but its destructiveness would be limited; it would not involve the entire world; and the gravest danger of the next world war—economic exhaustion so complete as to destroy civilization by destroying its material basis—would be ended once for all.

The chain of economic forces, then, lies behind the war peril, and if we eliminate that we eliminate the really serious aspect of the whole problem. This ought to be

easy enough, for the effort to end economic difficulties by war is at best not very intelligent. It frequently leads to economic disaster far worse than the situation it was intended to remedy. The aftermath of the World War is sufficient proof of that.

Since the economic dangers in warfare are quite as apparent as the possible economic gains, it seems strange that any statesman should be definitely preparing for war, or should ever even consider it. But though the risks of war are plain enough, the possible gains are equally clear. It is simply not true, as many well-intentioned but ill-informed pacifists maintain, that "war never pays". The implied threat of war—which unless skilfully employed leads to actual war—is often very profitable in diplomatic bargaining; and short, quick, successful wars often pay and pay very well. Almost every foot of American soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was wrested from the American Indians in a series of small wars. The British Empire has been built up by a series of small wars. Similarly, the prosperity of the German Empire before 1914 was due to a series of swift, successful conquests in 1864, 1866 and 1870. If the war in 1914 had gone according to the plans of the German General Staff, it would have been simply a fourth in this series of rapid, easy, and profitable victories, which would have given Germany new iron mines at the expense of France and badly needed ports on the North Sea at the expense

of Holland and Belgium.

No statesman wants a big war. In fact, no statesman wants any war—if he can get what he wants without fighting for it. Neither do the statesmen who oppose him want war. But war breaks out eventually because the time invariably comes when both sides want something that they cannot get without fighting, and neither will yield. When such a disaster occurs, the responsibility of statesmen is fully shared by the people who put them in power and keep them there, for *no government to-day can carry out any policy to which its people are really opposed*. Even when the statesmen are made the tools of corrupt commercial interests, the mass of the people are still morally responsible, for their ignorance or indifference makes such things possible.

The economic forces which to-day produce war cannot be wholly eliminated from modern life; but it ought to be possible to guide and control them so that they cease to be a danger. It ought to be possible to reach by agreement results as satisfactory and infinitely less expensive than those reached by war. The real obstacles to such guidance and control are the evil human passions—greed, fear, distrust, hatred, feelings of national or racial superiority, and megalomania of one kind or another. These are the human forces, psychological forces, moral forces—or, if you prefer, immoral forces—that lie behind the economic forces which in turn lie behind modern war. It is a situation

which an orthodox Christian of the old school might well attribute to original sin; which an orthodox Hindu might ascribe to *maya*; or which an orthodox Buddhist might regard as the evil fruit of Desire. *As usual, the older religious formulas, if broadly interpreted, apply with amazing accuracy to the realities of modern life.*

Greed lies behind the desire for inordinate economic expansion. It lies behind the cut-throat business competition of our times. It drives business houses into programmes of expansion outside national borders, leads them to seek exclusive fields of exploitation in primitive lands, causes them to try to exclude business men of other nations, and induces them to bring pressure upon their home governments to support their commercial ventures with diplomatic, military, or naval aid. One can see this happening in Japanese expansion in Manchuria, in British expansion in many parts of the globe, in American imperialism in Central and South America, although in the latter case it is encouraging to note a distinct change of heart in American diplomacy since the Roosevelt Administration came to power. *Greed as a motive is perhaps clearest of all in the intrigues of the armaments makers who play upon national fears to promote their individual profit, reckless of the fatal results that may follow.*

Fear is a natural corollary of greed. Business houses fear their own inability to maintain themselves in competition with foreign business men in foreign markets

without special favour due to diplomatic or military pressure from their home governments. Hence the shady intrigues for "spheres of influence" which were so marked a characteristic of diplomatic bargaining in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and which, though less obvious to-day, have by no means disappeared. In the same way, nations fear each other as each watches potentially hostile armaments growing, just across the border.

With such motives naturally goes mutual distrust among the nations, every one of which is to-day busily engaged in espionage on present friend and prospective foe alike. Spies seek out naval, military, and industrial secrets and endeavour to find out whether solemnly signed covenants and treaties are being kept or broken. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Covenant of the League of Nations, and all the other peace treaties have not led to any limitation of armaments, because no nation really trusts another's word.

Diplomats have seen too many treaties broken—by the Germans in Belgium, by the Japanese in China and Manchuria, by Americans in their dealings with the Red Indians. They will sign treaties; in most cases they will live up to treaties; but they simply will not trust in the good faith of the other signatories. Hence peace treaties or commercial accords, which might end the worst of the imperialist commercial rivalries, do singularly little good in the long run. The war plans go right on; and

where there is a war plan, sooner or later there is likely to be a war.

All this is complicated by national or racial hatreds which linger on from the bad old days of tribal warfare. Most of the Balkan nations, closely akin in language, religion, race, and culture though they are, have cordially detested each other for generations. The Chinese have little liking for the Japanese. Through a thousand years the French and Germans have been fighting. Even the commercial success of one nation leads others to hate it—one reason for anti-Japanese feeling is the ability of Japanese business men to undersell their European and American competitors. One reason why national minorities are ill-treated, and so stirred up to armed revolt, is the legacy of national hatreds.

Feelings of racial or national superiority are part of this general emotional attitude. Educated Americans know better than to despise Orientals, and have no difficulty in associating with them on friendly terms. But there are not many educated people in any land, and they have a relatively small share in determining the trend of national likes and dislikes. The average American, especially on the Pacific Coast, dislikes the Japanese because their physical appearance and their way of life are definitely unlike his own. He also dislikes their ability to outwork and undersell him. Hence the racial difficulties which would have led to war long since if both governments had not exhibited much good sense in limiting the possibilities of open

racial friction.

Finally, among these individual psychological-moral forces there is the megalomania, the strange admiration for mere bigness which characterizes our age and affects national life precisely as it affects personal life. It is a fault to which Americans are particularly prone, but in which other nations amply share. Nations want to be big for no better reason than to be regarded as Great Powers. It is a curiously foolish attitude. The only rational goal of national policy is the happiness of the nation's people, which certainly does not depend upon their numbers. The happiest nations are not necessarily great powers. More frequently they are small, highly civilized, pacific, well-governed states like Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden. Only one of these nations has been at war in more than a century, and then for a few weeks only.

Yet France struggles to keep up the population. Signor Mussolini encourages an already overcrowded Italy to produce more and more Italian babies, while Japan, equally crowded on her little islands, vehemently resists birth control propaganda.

Part of this attitude is due to fear and to the desire of general staffs to have an abundant supply of soldiers in the event of war. Part of it is due to fear of larger populations in adjoining states. But a large measure is simply the unreasonable confusion of bigness with greatness and with national happiness. Such an attitude practi-

cally ensures war, for it sets all nations expanding on a globe where the room for expansion is limited, forcing them into collision with one another.

To all these *we might add a single, all-embracing ethical fault, apparent in almost all modern nations—the sin of laziness as citizens.* We refuse our responsibilities. We refuse to watch over the actions of our governments. We refuse to do our duty as citizens and keep our governments on the path of our own highest interests, which—in the closely linked world of 1934—are in line with the general best interests of the world at large. As nations we long for peace, but we permit special interests to manoeuvre our governments into situations where war is inevitable. The best minds we have devote themselves to private gain or personal intellectual interests, not to the public good.

The war problem, like most human problems, can thus be reduced in the long run to the problem of balancing the good impulses in man's nature against the baser ones. The last World War was undoubtedly due to fifty years of friction due to economic pressures. But the economic pressures arose in the last analysis out of human desires; and it was the baser moral element in these human desires which made the economic problems impossible of solution without violence. In the ultimate analysis, the World War was due to moral faults and flaws in the human stuff which lay be-

hind national policies, including both the statesmen who determined the policies and the people who determined that the statesmen should be permitted to determine.

Signs are only too abundant that there has been little improvement in this respect. The economic pressures still exist and behind them lie the moral pressures. That they are steadily pushing us toward a new world war, it is difficult to deny. That they must necessarily succeed in driving us into war is

not so certain.

The moral reformation of the human race is what Americans call "a large order". The great moral leaders of the race have always failed to affect humanity as a whole and completely. But they have never failed completely. It is impossible to compare the modern world with, say, the Greco-Roman world and still believe that there has been no advance. The only question is whether the advance is coming fast enough to save us.

JOHN BAKELESS

II.—ASOKA, THE PRACTICAL PACIFIST

Asoka's empire extended up to Persia, thanks to his grandfather's conquests, but his greatness did not depend upon the mere extent of his dominion, great as it was, nor upon his services to the cause of universal religion. He ruled over an empire that extended practically from Persia to Southern Mysore. Much of it was his inheritance from his grandfather, Chandragupta Maurya (c. 323–299 B.C.), who achieved the credit of uniting in one empire the valleys of the Indus and other rivers of the Panjab with those of the Ganges and the Jumna. Then by 304 B.C., he achieved the further distinction of extending the boundaries of his Indian Empire up to those of Persia. This was the result of his conquests by which the eastern provinces of the Syrian Empire, then known as Gedrosia (Baluchistan), Aria (Herat), Arachosia (Kanda-

har), and the Paropanisadai (the country of Paropanisus, i.e., Hindu Kush) were ceded to him by a treaty by the defeated emperor, Seleukos. Thus the frontier problems were solved by Chandragupta Maurya by his successful prosecution of a bold forward policy which pushed the limits of India far beyond its present "scientific frontier" or "Durand Line". But his achievements were not confined to this frontier alone. His conquests were pursued far into the interior.

In the words of the only historian of the times, Plutarch, "not long afterwards, Androkottos, who had by that time mounted the throne, presented Seleukos with 500 elephants, and overran and subdued the whole of India with an army of 600,000." One of the most fruitful discoveries in history is that of Sir William Jones (Asiatic Researches, IV, 11) in identifying

the Greek name Androkottos with the Indian name, Chandragupta Maurya, mentioned in the Purāṇas. The story of Seleukos invading India to emulate the exploits of Alexander we also owe to foreign sources like Justin (xv. 4) and Appian (Syr. 55). His defeat by the Indian King made him purchase peace by ceding to him the eastern territories which had been his by settlements arrived at on the occasion of the partition of Alexander's empire in 323 and 321 B. C. The passage from Plutarch just quoted shows that Chandragupta Maurya practically carried out a series of three great conquests in the following order: (1) the conquest of the Indo-Gangetic Plains (by overthrowing Greek rule in the Panjab, and the Empire of the Nandas in the Gangetic Plains peopled by what the Greek writers call the Gangaridae and the Prasii, *i. e.*, Prāchyas or Easterns); (2) the conquests, beyond the North-Western Frontiers, of territories now included in Afghanistan and Baluchistan; and (3) the conquest of the south.

ASOKA'S DOCTRINE OF TRUE GLORY FOR A KING

Thus Asoka was not called upon to conquer an empire. He had it as a gift from his father. But, as has been stated, his greatness as a ruler did not depend entirely upon the size of his empire. He himself takes this view, and proclaims it in one of his inscriptions written on stone in imperishable characters which may be read to this day. In that Inscription [Rock Edict x], he is anxious to point out that the

true glory or fame of a king depends upon that of his people in achieving moral and spiritual progress. This is what is called Asoka's doctrine of *True Glory* for a king. There may be a far-flung empire on which the sun never sets, but its success is to be judged by the conditions of progress it can secure to the peoples composing it. A king cannot be viewed apart from his people. Both are bound to each other as organic parts of one corporate whole, the State. Thus the individual greatness of a ruler depends upon the collective greatness of his people.

HIS MEASURES OF MORAL UPLIFT OF HIS PEOPLE

Asoka's moral greatness was not confined to the mere originality and soundness of the views he held or the doctrines that he preached. He was so sincere in his convictions that he at once gave effect to them with all his imperial power and resources. He was terribly in earnest about all that he preached. With him, example always preceded precept. When he felt that he, as a ruler, must be judged by the condition of his people, he at once devoted himself to a vigorous campaign for achieving their moral uplift by the institution of a regular Ministry of Morals with a special staff (called *Dharma-Mahāmātras*) entrusted with a wide variety of functions, and a sphere of work that embraced the whole of India. In one of his Edicts [Rock Edict v], he states:—

These Ministers of Morals have been employed among all sects for the establishment and growth of Dharma

(piety or morality) of those inclined to it . . . among the soldiers and their chiefs, ascetics and householders, the destitute and the infirm . . . They are also employed to give relief in suitable cases from judicial punishments or abuses.

He thus undertook the moral improvement of his people on a continental scale.

ASOKA ABOLISHES WAR.

Another striking proof of his greatness was his doctrine of *True Conquest*. We have seen how vast was his empire, yet he was not tainted by any lust for conquests, or "earth-hunger," which impels a conqueror to further conquests. He was not at all filled with the spirit of *dig-vijaya* which led his grandfather to found the Maurya Empire, a militant spirit which is fully approved for a king in the Hindu Śāstras on Polity. These always insist on the ambition and duty of a king to be a king of kings and the sole sovereign of the earth or available space (*samrāt, eka-rāt*, or *sārva-bhauma*). In his early days, following these prevailing and time-honoured ideals of kingship and the example of his ancestors, Asoka indulged in a conquest by which his territories were rounded off in the east, the conquest of Kalinga (Orissa). But the conquest was won ruthlessly and "forcibly" against a brave people fighting for freedom, "not hitherto subdued" (*avijitam*), resulting in colossal carnage and casualties, "150,000 carried off as captives, 100,000 slain, and several hundreds of thousands dead of their wounds". These bloody sights and cruelties,

this extermination of a people's liberty by sheer brute force, for which the king felt himself personally responsible, produced a complete reaction, a revolution, in his mind, which turned at once with a revulsion from a creed of Violence to that of an unqualified Non-Violence (*ahimsā*).

With Asoka, there was no gap between thought and action, theory and practice. He proceeded at once to give effect to this creed of Non-Violence in all spheres of his life and work, personal and public, and to run his kingdom thenceforth as a Kingdom of Righteousness on the basis of a Universal Peace, peace between man and man, and between man and every sentient creature. In his personal life, he turned vegetarian, abolished the daily slaughter of thousands of animals for purposes of the royal kitchen [Rock Edict i], all public amusements and sports connected with cruelties to animals [*Ibid*], hunting and pleasure trips (*vihāra-yātrās*) in which the kings indulged [Rock Edict viii]; and finally his activities culminated in the outlawry of war as an unmixed evil. "The chiefest conquest is the conquest of Right and not of Might," declared Asoka [Rock Edict xiii]. The drum of war (*bheri-ghosha*) was hushed throughout India. Only *dharma-ghosha*, the call to moral life, religious proclamations, could be heard [Rock Edict iv]. Immediately, the emperor's healing message of assurance was sent in all directions: "The king desires that his unsubdued borderers, the peoples

on his frontiers, should not be afraid of him but should trust him, and would receive from him not sorrow but happiness" [Kalinga Rock Edict II]. Even the primitive aboriginal peoples were assured of their freedom: "Even upon the forest folks in his dominions, His Sacred and Gracious Majesty looks kindly" [Rock Edict XIII]. To subjugate them on the plea of civilising them was no part of Asoka's political system. The only condition for their freedom was that they must "turn from their evil ways" that they be not "chastised" [*Ibid.*]. The king was only anxious "to set them moving on the path of piety" [Kalinga Rock Edict II].

HIS MORAL CONQUESTS, BOTH IN INDIA AND ABROAD

Thus Asoka was the first in the world to usher in the reign of law and non-violence, abolishing militarism, conquest by force and bloodshed, which Sanskrit political writers appropriately designate as *Asura-Vijaya*, the conquest that becomes only a demon. He stood for the opposite kind of conquest, what he calls *Dharma-Vijaya*, the conquest that is won by love (*priti*) and results in subjection and paying homage only to Dharma or Morality. Henceforth, he was busy only with these "moral" conquests, which were extended all over the country, and even beyond to foreign countries. Within his dominions, the political map of his empire was dotted over with patches of independent territory which would have been deemed as so many blots on the escutcheons

of other conquerors in history like Akbar or Aurangzeb. The steam-roller of annexation which crushed the independence of so many small States and peoples, and brought a united India under the undisputed sovereignty of his grandfather, Asoka did not permit to roll farther and complete its levelling process by a ruthless fulfilment of the full programme of conquests marked out for him by his predecessors on the throne. He proclaimed his imperial decree: "Thus far and no farther."

But this only released his energies for his scheme of moral conquest. The resources that were released by prescription of war and by disarmament were now devoted to the processes of peace, to a vigorous prosecution of social service and welfare work among the masses all over the country. He began by organising on a continental scale measures of relief of suffering of both man and animal by the establishment of appropriate medical institutions such as provision of medical men, medicines, hospitals, and special botanical gardens for the cultivation of medicinal plants, indigenous or foreign, to supply raw materials for the manufacture of medicines in pharmaceutical works. Says the King in Rock Edict II—

Everywhere have been instituted two kinds of medical treatment, treatment of man and that of cattle (in veterinary hospitals). Medicinal herbs . . . have been caused to be imported and planted in all places wherever they did not exist. Roots also and fruits have been similarly imported and planted everywhere.

Next, he went farther in his scheme of relief by providing supply of water and shade along the highways: "On the roads, wells also have been dug and trees planted for the comfort of men and cattle" [Rock Edict II]. His full scheme of welfare work is thus detailed:—

On the high roads . . . banyan trees were planted by me that they might give shade to cattle and men; mango-gardens were planted, and wells dug, at each half-kos; rest houses were built; and many watering-stations were constructed for comfort of men and cattle [Pillar Edict VII].

A PIONEER OF WORLD-PEACE AND NON-VIOLENCE

It will thus be recognised that Asoka easily takes his place as the Pioneer of Peace in the world, having stood for principles which the League of Nations has been formed to achieve, such as the outlawry of war as an absolute evil; recognition of the brotherhood of all States and peoples, great or small, in independence and sovereignty; disarmament, and the like. He was also the first in the world who, without waiting for speculation on his ideals, gave effect to them at once in his own Empire, from which war was excommunicated, and thereby spiritualised Indian politics for the time being. He also tried to bring his neighbouring States in Western Asia and Europe to his way of thinking and to that end he

spent freely from the revenues of India. This is a record in international service in foreign countries financed by the resources of one's own country.

ASOKA'S WORK TOO ADVANCED TO SURVIVE HIM

Unfortunately, his ideals were too far ahead of his age to survive him. The system of politics which he had established in his vast dominion on the basis of non-violence, disarmament, universal peace and international good-will, and which he had tried to introduce to several European countries, practically died with him. There are some unkind critics who even hold him to be liable for the downfall of the Mauryan Empire which his grandfather had built up with so much of military effort and heroism. Asoka's pacifism and non-violence found its nemesis in the installation of the Śunga Empire and the performance by its founder of the ceremony of horse-sacrifice to celebrate that event. The ascent of Man has been a bloody process, as in all other evolution. But it should not be so. Man must work out his evolution in ways that should not be always those of Nature "red in tooth and claw". The only salvation for humanity lies in its realisation of what Asoka had stood for and realised for his country as its ruler.

RADHAKUMUD MOOKERJI

ARYANISM: NEW AND OLD

[Philip Mairet, acting Editor of the late Mr. Orage's *New English Weekly*, here demonstrates how the new Aryanism, rampant in Germany to-day, "is as bluntly materialist and nationalist" as the "Indian conception is spiritual and universal". He refers to ancient Aryanism on which the scholarly article of Professor S. V. Venkateswara which immediately follows, throws a great deal of light.—Eds.]

I.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE NEW ARYANISM

Recent events in Europe have included, amongst other things strangely reminiscent of the Feudal Ages, a violent persecution of the Jews in Germany. No Western power has staged such a persecution on a national scale for centuries, and it has already produced an extensive literature, of rabid anti-Semitism, of fervid Jewish nationalism, of liberal deprecation and pleas for toleration; and much ink has been spilt in bitterness, angry mendacity and desperation. One would think that all the embers of the age-long hostility between Judaism and Christianity had flared up again in unquenchable wrath. Yet the truth is that this persecution is not the reappearance of that traditional European animosity, but a complete departure from it. This is not a persecution of the Jews as the enemies of Christianity. It is a new feud, waged under a new name: a repression of the Semite as the spiritual enemy of the "Aryan".

This new "Aryan" idealism of the present national movement in Germany is totally different in conception from that which centres around the same word in Indian tradition. To the devout Indian,

the Aryan tradition is of a race of mythological antiquity, which bequeathed to all posterity an universal, human and spiritual culture. It signifies a religion, far more than a physical ancestry; a way of attainment of the Truth of the Self which is open to all beings; and a profoundly aristocratic conception of human society in which the lives of the philosopher, the saint, the administrator, the merchant or craftsman are conceived equally as paths to the attainment of the single goal of human consciousness.

Now, German "Aryanism" is as bluntly materialist and nationalist as this Indian conception is spiritual and universal. It affirms the supremacy of a portion of the white race as a natural, biological aristocracy, and affirms only one—a rather narrowly militaristic—ideal of character. The product of theorists such as Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Lothrop Stoddard, the avowed aim of this doctrine has always been to extend and intensify the imperialism of the pure-blooded "white" race—or sometimes, more explicitly, the "Nordic" race—over all the other peoples of the earth.

The original inventors of this

racial theory actually had in view, if somewhat vaguely, some kind of co-operation between the "white" nations in a world-policy to keep the yellow, brown and black races in due subordination, and to superintend their future development. In passing, it may be said that there was much genuine, and even sound, human idealism in their vision, as well as a very wide, though frankly biassed, knowledge of the world and of history. If their vision had been realised, the most powerful nations of mankind would have devoted their statesmanship to organizing all the races and nations into a hierarchy. At the apex of power they would have placed the "Nordic" nations, immediately followed by the other white races—Latin, Slav and Aryan Indian, probably in that order; descending upon racial strata of darker and darker hues to the ultimate basis of the black races.

The best that can be said for this conception is that it postulated a more conscious administration of the modern world, roughly according to the already existing tendencies of commercial-imperialistic development. But it needs little reflection to realise that as a political vision the whole view was fantastic. Apart from the mixed racial ingredients of all the political entities known as "nations"—which present a difficulty amounting to impossibility in such a nation as the United States, for instance,—this theory left out of account that the very same methods of financial-imperialism

which gave the Western Powers their wide dominion and influence, placed them in opposition to one another and precluded their co-operation. When this was catastrophically proved by the Great War, one would have thought that the "Nordic-Aryan" vision, never very widely entertained, would have vanished altogether. On the contrary, however, it leapt into sudden political notoriety, in a distorted form.

Germany adopted the notion as the basis of an intensified nationalism, both to compensate for the humiliation of her defeated Imperialism, and to heighten her self-regard in the midst of a Europe turning more nationalistic than ever. Baulked of imperial expansion in physical fact, it was as though Germany sought for an emotional supremacy, claiming a new "kingdom of the air" by purely historical rights, (such as her ancient position in the Mediæval Empire) and founding this claim especially upon her "Aryan" ancestry. And as no such claim could at present be upheld against other nations, it had to be rigorously enforced against the foreign element within Germany's own borders—the Jews. "Semite" being conceived as the very antithesis of "Aryan," Jews were all to be degraded in status or else expelled from the country.

Europe has many times persecuted the Jews, but never before in the naked name of nationality or race. The traditional hostility to the Jew was not contempt for his nation but horror at his religion.

He had rejected the Christian revelation. In one respect, the result was the same, for persecution, whether upon tribal or sectarian grounds, causes the persecuted to unite in closer and more subtle co-operation and in deeper hostility to the State which proves a harsh foster-parent. Yet it is undoubtedly worse to oppress a people as biologically, ancestrally inferior than to excommunicate them as perverse in doctrine. The spiritual injury is graver. It may be true, as we are often told, that the Jews have suffered less actual privation of life, position and property in this German persecution than in earlier times. But the mediæval persecutions, blind and bloody outbreaks of wrath as they often were, did not insult the Israelite's ancestry and origin.

Mediæval Christendom condemned the Jews for their narrow, tribal spirit, and Christendom had a right to do so, for it was not itself national. In its creative period, Christian culture was anti-Imperial and super-national, and regarded the national pride of the Jews as a sin. But far from vilifying the ancestry of Israel, Christendom actually glorified it and popularised the epic of Jewish ancient history more than did the Jews themselves. The error and iniquity of the Jews was to pride *themselves* upon having such forbears; to give themselves the airs and the arrogance of nationality. And that really is iniquitous. It is precisely that arrogance which is the condemnation of Germany's spurious Aryanism.

Like all the most bitter and enduring quarrels, the feud between Jew and Christian has been an opposition based upon a deeper unity. Dispossessed of their own fatherland and dispersed over the world, the Jews generally chose to live, and succeeded best in thriving, in Christian countries. For there, where they suffered ignominy as the race which had crucified its own supreme Teacher, they also enjoyed the prestige of their descent from the intimate actors in the Christ-drama. The presence of Jews in Christendom, far from being an offence to the Christian religion, has always been a living witness to its historical reality; and although the Christian teaching tended to arouse feelings of antipathy against the Jews, the Church consistently protected them. Both their denial of Christ's Divinity and their affirmation of His historical background were of positive advantage to the religion of Europe—an advantage maintained by a guarded toleration, which enabled them to live in their own faith, varied by persecutions which hardened their sectarian spirit.

This paradoxical position of the Jews, as a minority both oppressed and privileged, was due to their strange position as equally friends and foes of Christianity. Yet it did not disappear with the Reformation, the break-down of the Mediæval system and the growth of religious toleration. The new Protestant sects maintained, on the whole, the same attitude towards Jews: and although in recent times a

general religious decline has weakened the ancient antipathy, the growth of nationalism has developed a new antagonism. The privilege of this minority, which prospered with the disintegration of religious barriers, has become more actively resented as national barriers have hardened, for the Jews now take on the appearance of an international nation, with an unwarrantable influence in each separate nation's affairs. That is the root of active "anti-Semitism" in many places to-day, and of the present outbreak in Germany.

This ancient racial question is therefore no nearer solution in the modern West, in spite of the progress and culture of the modern Jews, who have made many valuable contributions to modern civilization. One thing is clear—that persecution only intensifies the problem. So long as the present phase of false nationalism endures, by which all Europe is dominated and Germany almost demented, the Jewish question will increase in difficulty. Even the Zionist solution, of a Jewish national colony in Palestine, whatever merits can be claimed for it upon other grounds, offers no immediate relief, for it tends to stiffen the Jews in their nationalist attitude without removing them from their unique international position.

This problem will be solved only when the present phase of Nationalism is over, and when the Christian religion awakens to the need of a broader basis to its universal Gospel than that of Jewish patriarchalism. The spirit-

ual origin of Christ is not Jewish, and certainly not "Aryan" in the German sense. It is one with the origin of Krishna, of the Buddha, of Lao-tze or of Zoroaster, as well as with that of Moses. That Christianity should continue to teach with a Bible, of which more than three-quarters consists of Hebrew scriptures, but which contains not a word of any other of the older revelations of the human race, is an anomaly in any modern, world-conscious culture.

For that is the heart of the matter. Present European Christianity is not Christianity, but is only Judeo-Christianity, and it is high time this should be reformed. There is no justification in the present world for presenting the Gospel of Christ, which in its true nature is the European aspect of *Loka-Samgraha*, of World-Religion, as if it were merely a kind of neo-Judaism. Can anyone believe that the *Song of Solomon* is of more spiritual inspiration than the *Bhagavad-Gita*, or that *Deuteronomy* is more essential to salvation than the *Tao Teh King*? By clinging to a mass of Hebrew lore, largely inessential, Christians give to Judaism a prestige in world-religious tradition which is wholly disproportionate; they both intensify the tribal-complex of Judaism and arouse fear and resentment against it. It is very significant that in Soviet Russia, where there is no political differentiation against the Jew at all, either political or religious, Jewish sectarianism is disappearing and the Jewish problem with it.

It was the spirit of Christ which gave to the West an essential culture, which inspired all that was best in the aristocratic order of Mediævalism. That culture, in its many-sided unity, was one with the Aryan tradition of the East. To Aryanism in that sense, which is the culture of the whole world's spiritual heritage, Europe can return only by freeing her religious consciousness from the historic

accident of a preponderant Judaism, and learning to value equally all the great scriptures of the human race. Then, and only then, it will be possible for the Jews and their contribution to be painlessly absorbed. The "Semitic problem" of an anomalous nationalism will disappear. But it will never be forcibly expelled by an "Aryanism" which is itself only a more flamboyant Nationalism.

PHILIP MAIRET.

II.—THE ARYAN PATH

The word "Ārya" appears in the earliest hymns of the *Rg-Veda*. It has been assumed to have an ethnical import, but the significance is cultural rather than racial in most passages. The Ārya is contrasted with Dasyu and Dāsa (e.g. *R. V.* II, 11. 18; VI, 60, 16). He sacrificed to the bright and friendly powers of Nature. He attached much importance to the virtues of chastity and continence. He had well-developed vocal organs, and his utterance was clear, and accentuated. He cooked his own food, and drank what cheered and exhilarated but did not intoxicate. He represented, therefore, a distinct type of culture. Very few Vedic passages show a possibly ethnological sense. The name "Krishna" of a Dasyu chieftain is not necessarily anthropological, though in later times it came to denote a dark complexion. Nor does the epithet *anāsa* demand interpretation as "snub-nosed". It may mean "phonetically imperfect" (*himsitavagindriya*) and is so

explained by the scholiasts who have commented on the expression. Much has been made of the expression "Āryam varṇam" in the texts. The term *varṇam* here should not be taken in its later sense of "colour" or "caste". It meant "character" like the analogous word "rūpam". This sense was retained as late as Kalidasa's time: "Rājā prajā ranjana labdha varṇah." (The king gets his character of kingliness by pleasing his subjects.) (*Raghuvamśa* VI. 21). The sense of "complexion" is out of the question in this passage. On the other hand, several hymns emphasise the cultural character of the Āryas—the Āryan moral law (*vrata*), cosmic law (*ṛta*) and the world of the spirit (*dharma, ātma*). The word Ārya is not found as a national name in the *Rg-Veda*.

The derivation of the word has long exercised the minds of scholars. Bopp suggested *Ar* "to go," or *Arch* "to venerate". Max

Müller condemned the former etymology as giving no adequate sense, and the latter as quite impossible. Giles disputes Müller's derivation from *irā*, the earth. Horrowitz has pointed out that there is no connection between Ārya and arable land. *Ar* in the sense of "to plough" (Lat., *arare*) is confined to the languages of Europe, and is not a Vedic or Avestan root. Lassen explained it like "Āchārya," but this would not account for the other form *Arya* (with the short *a*). *Arya* and *Aryapatni* are contrasted with *Dasyu* and *Dāsapatni* in the *Rg-Veda*, and Ārya is in juxtaposition to Śūdra in the *Yajur-Veda* (v. s. xx. 17). Indian grammarians are almost unanimous in deriving *Arya* from *Araniya* (= *pūjaniya*, "worthy of respect"). As primary derivations we have the term *Aryamyam*, "the venerable" applied to God Varuṇa, the fountain of Vedic righteousness (in *R. V.* v. 85. 7), and *Aryaman* (*Aryam śreshtam mimita*). Ārya and *Arya* seem, therefore, to have an ethical rather than an ethnical sense.

"Ārya" had no possibly racial sense at all in post-Vedic times. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* we find the term *Arya miśra* qualified by "good and virtuous people". ("Samrakshan Āryamiśraṇām sādḥūnām guṇa vartinām": *Aryamisras* who are good and virtuous people.) In the *Mahābhārata* it is in juxtaposition to "greedy and grasping". ("Āryavratascha Panchālo na sa rājā dhana priyah": The king Panchala who was *Aryavrata* had no greed of wealth. A.

ch. 201.) "Neither learning nor religion but conduct alone is the mark of the Arya" ("Vrttena hi bhavatyāryo na dharmena na Vidyayā" U. P. ch. 86). Manu has almost the same words and exactly the same definition. The Rājā, he says, should protect those who are *Aryavrttas*, "who do good and refrain from evil". He should punish those who are thorns in the side of society. The deeds of an Aryan reveal his character (*Manu* x. 757). Jain texts explain the Aryan virtues as devotion to Wisdom, conquest of the lower self of passion, and absolute Truth. The same sense appears in *Kālidāsa*. In the *Śakuntala*, Dushyanta makes the heroine out to be marriageable, as his *Arya* mind has been moved by love. ("Yad Āryam asyām abhilāshi me manah": Since my noble mind has desired her.—*Sak.* I. 22). The term here means a mind "free from lust or base passion". In the *Raghuvamśa* the hero is described "as acceptable to the Āryas, and contrasted with the lion who is making a harmless cow his prey" ("Tam Āryagrhyam nigrihitadhenuh":—*Raghu.* II. 33). Evidently the way of the Āryas. (*brahmacharyam* and *ahimsa*) implied disapproval of lust and of injury. Māgha emphasises that "those of Ārya disposition could be moved only by sincere regard, and not by considerations of power or pelf" ("Grahītum Āryān paricharyayā muhuh"—*Situpālavadha*).

Obviously, the racial sense of Ārya and a "superiority complex,"

if it ever existed at all, had died out long before the emergence of the Germans in European history. It was a universally accepted Indian principle that "knowledge makes for humility, and thus prepares one for the higher life" (*Vidyā dadāti vinayam vinayadyāti pātratam*). But this humility did not mean sacrifice of self-respect. It meant a stern regard for one's duty. So says Śrī Kṛṣṇa in the *Gīta*: "Whence this faint heartedness, unworthy of the Ārya (*anārya jushṭam*), opposed alike to worldly glory and welfare after death." *Anārya* in our dramatic literature always means "ignoble," not "base-born".

Aryan or Indo-Irānic culture spread broadcast the value of the higher religious life. There are no common god-names in the Indo-European languages or any term denoting the temple. The Sumerians worshipped Mithra and Sams, and Mitra and Amśa are phases of the sun in the Vedic texts. Sumerian Sin (the moon) has his analogue in *Sinivāli*. Worship of these gods presents a later stage in Vedic religion than that of Agni (the Fire-god), and Agni is not worshipped as a god by the Sumerians and Assyrians. Nor is he in the pantheon revealed in the Boghaz-Keui inscriptions. Bagu or Bogū is the name for the supreme deity in the Slavo-Lettic group of languages, and he was worshipped among the Slavs and the Phrygians. The Kassite word for god is *Bagaio*s. It is well known that Ahura Mazda is styled Bhaga Bhaganam (God of gods). *Bhaga*

van is the word for god in Vedic, Sanskrit and Prakrit. That the borrowing is from Aryan or Indo-Iranian is indicated by the Greek *Kadmos* (from Hebrew *quedem*, "the East"), Greek *Theos* "spoken by god" (from Vedic *Asu* breath) and Old High German *atum* (Vedic *ātma*, breath). Sumerian *Martu* and *Mertes* and Latin *Mars* could be derived from Vedic *Maruts*.

The greatest gift of Āryan culture was the gift of the Path. We find it expressed in the *Ramayana*: "Who but honours one that is on the Aryan Path?" (*Mārgam āryam prapannasya nānumanyeta kah pumān.*) "I am his man, for he is noble" (*So aham āryeṇa paravān*). It is interesting that the term "path" retained the Indo-Irānic sense in English, while the Romans had narrowed its use to bridges (c. Lat. *pontifex*) and the Greeks to the highway of the sea (*pontus*). The pursuit of the Path by the Aryans had its reflection in the political life of India, which struck the Greeks with some measure of surprise. Arrian records (*Indika* IX, 12): "A sense of justice, they say, prevented any Indian king from attempting conquest beyond the limits of India." Peace has her victories no less renowned than those of war.

II

Among the speakers of the Indo-European languages the easternmost spoke Indo-Iranic. They had various words for the *Path*. They used their genius for sublimation in turning the thoughts of human beings from the mechanical and

worldly to the moral and metaphysical.

Panthā was the highroad to the desired destination, whose variant is the Greek *Pons*, *Pontys*, a bridge or ford over a trade-path; It is thus described in a Tourist's hymn:

May the Panthā be free from thorns (anṛkshara) and from the dregs of society who are thorns in the side of the virtuous! May it be straight (rju) and free from perplexing epicyclic windings! May there be a guide on the path (sannetā) like Mitra the friend of the world, Pūshan the nourisher of the strong, and Aryaman the protector of the weak! May the purposeful traveller at his journey's end find his objective ready to fall, like ripe fruit, into his hands!

The term is used in a symbolic and figurative sense in the latest book of the *Rg-Veda*. The *Panthā* of the Fathers is referred to in the *Rg-Veda* (x. 130. 7), and that of the gods (*R. V. x. 2, 3.*). That leading to the next world or the world after bodily death is said to be directed by Yama (*R. V. x. 14. 1.*). The last is also mentioned in the *Atharva Veda* (18. 1. 49.). Its protectors, preservers, guards and guides are detailed in a later text (*T. A. iv. 2.*). The Iranian variant is *Pantay*, the easy straight path of Asha (*Rta*) and *Vohumana* (good thought) leading to the Paradise or Home of Song (*garo demana*).

A clearly moral, apart from the mythical and mystical, significance emerges in a passage of the *Rg-Veda* (x. 71. 6) which refers to the *summum bonum* of life as "the Path of Good conduct" (*sukrtasya panthā*). The idea is unfolded in a verse of the *Mahābhārata* (III 312. 12.)

Dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhāyām mahājano yena gatah sa panthāh.

The *Panthā* is the beaten road always trodden by the great. They derive their light from within: the voice of the conscience calling from the cavity of the heart.

Prapatha denotes the unexplored expanse of the wilderness. The Maruts are in an early text described as providing the traveller with refreshments (*Khādyah*) in the *Prapathas*, an ancient reference obviously to trade along the path of the trade-winds. Indra the god of victory "encompasses the widening field of battle" (*Samatsu prapathintamam Indram*). The moral sense is clear in *R.V. x. 17.6*: "God Pūsha created a pathway in the perplexing expanse of the Infinite" (*Prapathe patham ajanishtha Pūshā*). "Pūsha directs our intellect and activities on every hand" (*dhiyam dhiyam sishadhāti pra Pūshā*). A track or a path into the realm of the unknown was indeed a gift of the gods!

Patha, *Pathi* or *Pathyā* does not seem to mean the same as *Panthā*. Scholars have missed the difference in the denotation of the two words which occur together in one of the earliest passages (*R.V. vii. 44. 5.*) —*Ā no Dadhikrā pathyām anaktu rtasya panthām anvetavā u* ("May God Dadhikra [the Sun] shower blessings on the Path so that it may lead to the Pantha of Righteousness!"). The word *pantha* here clearly indicates the cosmic highway of Nature and her immortal law, while the term *Pathi* refers to a path or by-way cleared or cut for spiritual progress by the heart and

head of the obliging teacher or the aspiring pilgrim. *Pathi* has thus to be distinguished from the highway (*Pantha*) and the unexplored wilderness (*Prapatha*).

This distinction is supported by the association of "espy" or "show" with *Pantha*, and of "make" or "fashion" with *Pathi*. The god of Death is described as "showing the *Pantha* to many" (*bahubhuyah panthām anapaspaśānam*). "Those of steadfast faith are said to have their gaze fixed on the *Pantha* of the fathers" (*Purveshām panthām anudrśya dhirāh—R. V. x. 130. 7*). In one early hymn the bard says: "The path of the Gods is visible to me" (*R. V. vii. 76. 2.*), and human objective is explained as reaching the *Panthā* of the Gods (*R. V. x. 2. 3.*). This is contrasted with that of the Fathers (*R. V. x. 18. 1.*). On the other hand, ancient sages are described as "makers of the paths" (*pathi-kṛtaḥ*), and the Gods Agni, Savitā and Pūshā as path-makers, in contradistinction to Yama who is only a path-finder. *Pathikṛt* occurs frequently (*R. V. ii. 236*; *vi. 21. 12*; *ix. 106. 5*; *x. 111. 3*), but I have never come across *Pathakṛt* or *Panthakṛt* in any of the books of the *Rg-Veda*. In Greek *Pathos* is the trodden or beaten track. So in Teutonic where, however, the original is uncertain, and in pre-Teutonic where *bat* suggests the Latin *batuere*, to beat. (W. German *Path*; Old High German *phad*, *phath*, *pfad*, *fad*; Old Frisian *path*, *pad*; W. Frisian *paed*; E. Frisian *pad*, *path*, *fat*; Old Eng. *paeth*; Old Northumbrian *peth*.)

Variants of *pathā* and *pathya* are *padavi*, *padya*, and *padam*. The

supreme *padam* of Vishnu is usually rendered as "abode" in *Tad Vishnoh paramam padam* (that is the supreme abode of Vishnu). But the rendering does not fit in with the next part of the verse: "*Tad viprāso viprayavah jagrvāmsah samindhate*"—"The wise and religious, always alert and on their guard, stimulate and quicken the *padam* as fuel does the fire." Evidently, it is the way of life that is here meant, which it is the aim of the wisdom-religion to keep jealously against all tempting odds. Vishnu *padam* in this passage is clearly analogous to *Brahma patham* in *Chhāndogya Upanishad* (*vi. 15. 6.*) and to the "right and true paths" that lead the Ahura in the *Yasna* (*43. 3*). "One going by the paths indeed attains the end" (*A. B. IV. 17*).

Vishnu *padam* is the path of Service and Sacrifice: "Yajno vai Vishnuh." So is the supreme *padam* of *Brahma* explained in the *Laws of Manu* :—

He who is able to discern, by the pure luminosity of his own self, himself and no other in all the Universe, can identify himself with every being, and reaches unto the path of the supreme *Brahma* ("Evam yah sarva bhuteshu paśyatyātmānam ātmanā sa sarvasamatām etya Brahmāpyeti param padam"—*Manu XII, 124*).

"Light on this path is shed only by introspection and a searching inquiry on the part of the progressing pilgrim" (*param brahma anveshamāṇāh—Prasna Upd*).

This use of *padam* has survived in all later literature: The *Gita* has evolved a form which acquired a classical use—*prapad*. *Māmeva ye*

prapadyante māyām etām taranti te, "Those who walk along the path that leadeth unto me, they are freed from the clutches of *māyā*," which I believe is the earliest use of the word *prapatti* or selfless surrender to the path of the Lord famous in the literature of Sri Vaishnavism.

Padavi first appears in the famous *Hamsavati* hymn :—

What is the one and indivisible Brahman to the Gods is the source of illumination to seers and the light on the path of those gifted with the inner vision. (*Brahmā devānām padaviḥ Kavīnām Ṛshir viprāṇām.*)

Late in the sixth century *Bhartrhari* uses the word in the same sense: "Anuyāhi Sadhu padvim (follow the path of the Good)". Compare "The path of the Great is to be followed": *padam anuvīdhyaṁ cha mahatām—Nitisataka II 77*. The emphasis here is on righteousness and good conduct. When *bhakti* or the path of devotion came into prominence, *padavi* was used in that sense. The foremost musician of South India, *Theāgarāja Swāmi*, begins a quatrain with the musical phrase—*padavi ni haribhakti*: "Devotion to the lord Hari is the supreme way".

Other terms denoting the Path were similarly invested with ethical import. An early word is *gātu*, the "way to go". "Agni the well-intentioned lights the *gātu* for the worshipper" (*R. V. iv. 4. 6*). This path is strait and *Soma* is requested to widen it to the pilgrim's vision (*urum no gātum Kṛṇu Soma mīddhvah, R. V. vi. 85. 4*). Elsewhere, *Mitra* is described as shin-

ing on the *gātu* that leads to the Infinite (*urukshayāya gātum vanate. R. V. v. 65. 4*). The texts of the *Yajur Veda* indicate that "all divine beings, being children of light, are knowers of the *gātu*" (*devāh gātuvidah—T. S. I. 1. 12*).

Vartana in *R. V. i. 85. 3* is merely a trade-route. It means a race-course in the *Boghaz Keui* inscriptions (fifteenth century B. C.—*aeva vertenna*) and the *Yajur Vedic* texts (*āsvasya vivartana*). But we have the expression "*Rudrasya Vartanī*," which would make nonsense unless interpreted as "the path of Rudra". *Bhavabhūti* (seventh century) uses *Vartana* in the sense of regulated life (*Smarasi cha tad upānteshu āvayor Vartanāni—I. 26*).

A variant of the word is *Vartma* which means conduct in the *Bhagavad Gita*: "Mama Vartmā anuvartante manushyāḥ Pārtha sarvaśah" (O Partha, men mostly follow my Path). *Kālidāsa* clinches the use of the term when he speaks of the *Vartma* of *Manu* (*Raghuvamśa I, 19*) which, as we have seen, was described in Vedic texts as the Path of *Manu*. The stress, however, is on discipline, "the checking of the straying from the Path" (*niyantuh nemi vrttayah*).

The word *Marga* is not found in the *Rg-Veda*. In the Gupta age (fourth century) it denoted only the most convenient route, of which the knowledge entailed elaborate enquiry (*anveshana*). It is the word used to denote the route taught of the Cloud Messenger (*Meghadūta—I. v. 8*). But it was used in a clearly ethical sense in

the Buddhist texts which describe the noble eightfold path (*e.g.*, Digha nikāya, Sutta 22). The *Bhakti* or devotional cults of a Personal God were known as *Mārga* in later Hinduism. The *Viśuddha mārga* of Buddhaghosha is a commentary and corollary to the *Dharmapada* and *Sutta Nipāta*. Kālidāsa uses the expression in the sense of "quest". *Vichāra-mārga-prahitena chetasā*, (By mind on quest with thought. *Ku.* v, 42 and *Rit.* II 72.) So also in the *Bhāṭṭikāvya*, (I. 12) "Varam amargit".

Vayunam was always used in a moral sense. The sun is prayed to as *Vayunāvit* (*R. V.* v. 64. 3) and Agni, likewise, whose "light reveals the relative merits of the perplexing paths and ways" (*Vayunāni Vidvān*). In later hymns Agni is spoken of as like the boat on the waters, helping the pilgrim to ford and taking him across the sweeping flow of "sins and shortcomings" (*durita*). In *Vayuna* we have the original of the *rectum vitae viyam* of the Latin poets, which is concealed from view by the veil of Ignorance (*vayunāni vaste*, a Rg-Vedic expres-

sion which Sankara translates thus: *Sruti bhava Vayunāni evam āchhādayanti* (Thus they conceal the meaning of Shrutis). *Vayuna* is used for the Path or the way frequently in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (*e.g.* vi. 20; x. 8.). In one passage *Manu* is spoken of as the *Vayuna*, *i.e.*, (the shower of) the Path.

As the Path acquired the moral sense, emphasis shifted to the light on the path, guidance and leadership. Thus we have the Sanskrit word "*hotā*" (*Zend, Zoatar*) Greek "*hodos*" (literally way or road). It is pre-eminently the epithet of Agni the Torch-bearer, (*R. V.* i. 1. 1; i. 15.). "Agni is the Torch-bearer, lighting the road of knowledge, the truth, and the manifold glory of life (*Agnir hotā kavikratuh satyah chitra-sravastamah*). The same sense rings in our ears centuries later and practically the same words are used in St. John's Gospel (xiv. 6) "I am the Way, the Truth and the Life". "I am the Light of the World. He that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life."

S. V. VENKATESWARA

No Arhan, O Lanoo, becomes one in that birth when for the first the Soul begins to long for final liberation. Yet, O thou anxious one, no warrior volunteering fight in the fierce strife between the living and the dead, not one recruit can ever be refused the right to enter on the Path that leads toward the field of Battle.

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE

MINDS ARE COLOURED BY CONDITIONS, BUT COLOUR IS ONLY SKIN DEEP

[Ransome Sutton is the Science Editor of the *Los Angeles Times*. What he says in praise of science as a moralising force creating universal brotherhood is not altogether true; *e.g.*, what about scientists selling their discoveries and inventions to the war-mongers? But even so, it is not difficult to concede that the attitude of science to nature and man is nearer the truth than that of religions. —EDS.]

Bitterly indeed we Americans have learned that war does not pay. As the result of a Civil War among ourselves, antagonisms were created which greatly interfere with our internal welfare. During a war with Spain, we seized the Philippines, raised our flag over 13,000,000 aliens, and have since learned that the seizure was a mistake, morally and politically as well as financially. Then, largely because of gratitude to France and loyalty to England, we squandered our best blood and wealth in the world's worst war and must now pay the piper. And these tragic experiences apply to all nations that have ever made war on other nations.

Until recently, my countrymen thought themselves very religious. Naturally so, because the country was settled by congregations seeking religious freedom—Puritans, Huguenots, Quakers and many other creeds. The toleration they sought, however, was not practised by them. Puritan congregations were tight little packs whose psychology obliged them to hate all other creeds—for the love of God and the hope of heaven. Shooting red men was no violation of the commandment which says:

"Thou shalt not kill," although it was both law and gospel "thatt the worde of God shall be the onely rule to be attended unto in ordering the affayres of government".

Other creeds were equally intolerant. They had just enough religion to make them hate, but not enough to make them respect one another. It was the descendants of such peoples that spread across the continent.

My parents were a part of the great migration. In Kansas the parties which brought them together settled, took up homesteads, fenced fields, built a church and school house. In the church, circuit riding ministers flayed the devil and the Pope. We were largely Methodists, and Methodism then was fiercely evangelical. Other Protestant creeds were tolerated, but Catholicism was taboo. In the school, the teachings squared with the preachings in the church. Now fancy our feelings when a family of Roman Catholics settled among us! Sure, we shunned them—at first. But how could you go on shunning folks who were always doing good? Just as soon as we became acquainted with these new neighbours, we

learned to like them and to respect their beliefs. And what happened there always happens whenever well-meaning individuals or nations become acquainted with one another. As stated by Jonathan Swift:—

There is nothing wanting to make all rational and disinterested people in the world of one religion, but that they should walk together every day.

In the United States, there are still many hair-splitting creeds, but the devotees touch elbows, and nowhere, save in certain backwoods sections, are neighbours judged by their religious affiliations.

During the last fifty years, I have seen a still more saving grace at work on the mind of man. That serene influence is science. To geographical boundaries it pays no attention. No difference where or by whom a new discovery is made, the whole world rejoices. Its announcements are real revelations. Pack patriotism still builds up tariff walls, battleships and international antagonisms, but already science has done more than all the missionaries to soften the savagery of pack patriotism. Nations yet claim the right to prey upon one another, but no nation nowadays interferes with the inflow or outflow of new knowledge. We do not even think of scientific research in terms of nationality. We think of it as universal, something which belongs by right to everybody regardless of government or local laws, and Langdon-Davies has convinced me that its re-

searches lead through the mazes of all religions toward God indwelling in the universe.

Everywhere sensible men and women are becoming more and more aware of weaknesses in their own theologies. In even the most sacred writings there are conflicting passages, where the hands of inspired writers seem to have slipped, and in these passages largely lurk the implications which sects exaggerate into creeds. Looking beneath man-coined words for fundamental truths, science is surely stripping away the rags of superstition; and the theology that remains is beautifully of one accord.

Recently, I had an opportunity to look through a collection of bibles including the sacred writings upon which all the great religions are founded, and was amazed to find them so fundamentally similar. If you search for concord rather than for discord in these venerable volumes, you find it—find the same golden rules running through them all.

Science has just one aim—to place knowledge in the seat of ignorance. "I am no scientist, although I read your articles with a feeling of great gratitude," a minister who once did a good deal of anathematizing has just written me. "If I had my way every preacher would be compelled to study science along with theology. For facts, both physical and mental, as well as moral, are all intertwined and come together in the spiritual. The more science-minded I become, the more tolerant

I become toward everything and everybody."

Human nature, it seems, is naturally prejudiced against anything one is not up on. In his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, John Locke declared: "New opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason, but because they are not already common."

Science has to face that fact. Acquiring scientific information, however, is like getting acquainted with strangers: the frown of ignorance and prejudice disappears in the presence of understood truth. The white races have recently run to science. Some of its blessings have been given to the world: good roads, horseless carriages, electric lights, refrigerators, telephones, motion pictures, airplanes, radios, life saving methods of treating diseases and labour saving machinery. Such gifts, however, are still viewed with suspicion, particularly by peoples whose minds have specialized in philosophy or other forms of culture. To be able to build telescopes which bring the heavens down to earth may make us feel superior, but I have a feeling that this ability tends toward greater humility. When Sir Edwin Arnold came to California and looked through the then largest telescope, he said to the astronomers: "Your theories do not disturb my philosophies."

According to anthropologists, the races differ less than most of us suppose. They say we all belong to the same genus and species, our differences, both mental and physi-

cal, being mostly due to the conditions under which we live. After a careful study of various types of people in New York City, Dr. Franz Boas of Columbia University, former president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, concluded:

That the American-born descendants of these types differ from their parents, and that the differences develop in early childhood and persist throughout life... The head of the American-born Sicilian becomes rounder. The face becomes narrower, stature and weight increase... The American-born Hebrew has a longer and narrower head than the European-born... The average ability of the white race is found to the same degree in a large proportion of individuals of all other races... There is no reason to suppose that they are unable to reach the same level of civilization represented by the bulk of our own people.

In the public schools of Los Angeles, all the races come together, and the teachers tell me that dark pupils learn just as quickly as white ones. As a result of his studies, Professor Boas expressed the hope "that the data of anthropology may teach us a greater tolerance of forms of civilization different from our own".

No one nation has monopolized the Nobel Prize. It has been awarded to Americans, Austrians, Belgians, Canadians, Dutch, Danes, Englishmen, East Indians, Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, Norwegians, Poles, Russians, Spaniards, Swedes and Swiss. Although India has never made a speciality of science, one of her sons won the prize

in physics four years ago.

As a boy, I shared the white man's belief that jungle peoples are hopelessly ignorant, but a few months experience with jungle Africans cured me of that belief. They play a game called "Bao," which requires more memory, more foresight and more genius than any of the card games played by white people. They tom-tom intelligence across the continent—as, for example, when they drummed the news of the sinking of the Lusitania from Khartoum to Nigeria faster than the news could be relayed by cable. Many things they do are as magical to us as our radio is to them. And those who know them best suspect that their minds, having developed differently from ours, may be deeply wise in their own way.

Down on the Orinoco delta, I

saw a venomous snake strike a white man. No white doctor could have saved him, but a native medicine man did.

No matter how backward people may appear, break bread with them open-mindedly, and you will probably learn to like them and find yourself wondering at their peculiar wisdom, provided they are respected by their own law-abiding folks.

Our changing attitude toward other races represents the most important result of the operation of new scientific knowledge. Since all men are blood cousins, there seems to be no reason why everybody should not help science in its search for everybody's God. Nor does there seem to be any reason why anybody should close his eyes to the light revealed, whether brightly or dimly, by every religion.

RANSOME SUTTON

Atoms are called "Vibrations" in Occultism Atoms fill the immensity of Space, and by their continuous vibration are that MOTION which keeps the wheels of Life perpetually going As described by Seers—those who can see the motion of the interstellar shoals, and follow them in their evolution clairvoyantly—they are dazzling, like specks of virgin snow in radiant sunlight. Their velocity is swifter than thought, quicker than any mortal physical eye could follow, and, as well as can be judged from the tremendous rapidity of their course, the motion is circular Standing on an open plain, on a mountain summit especially, and gazing into the vast vault above and the spacial infinitudes around, the whole atmosphere seems ablaze with them, the air soaked through with these dazzling coruscations. At times, the intensity of their motion produces flashes like the Northern lights during the *Aurora Borealis*. The sight is so marvellous, that, as the Seer gazes into this inner world, and feels the scintillating points shoot past him, he is filled with awe at the thought of other, still greater mysteries, that lie beyond, and within, this radiant ocean

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, 633-634.

THE OUTCRY AGAINST COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

[Mr. P. T. Raju, M. A., Sastri, has Specialized in Nyaya (Logic) and at present is making a comparative research of the Hegelian and the Vedantic systems under the guidance of Sir S. Radhakrishnan at the Andhra University.—EDS.]

Serious doubts are felt by some people in India as regards the value and reliability of comparative philosophy.* The doubters allege that comparison is not only of no value, but also leads to misrepresentation. In favour of this view, it might perhaps be said that, in comparing our systems with those of the West, we generally tend to test the importance of the former by using the latter as the standard. In so doing, we tacitly or overtly hold the latter in higher esteem. As politically conquered by a Western nation, we regard it and its culture as superior to us and our culture. In comparing our philosophy therefore with that of the West, we help to aggravate our sense of inferiority—which is certainly undesirable.

If it is true that the feeling of inferiority is engendered or intensified by comparative philosophy, then certainly it is to be discouraged. But on the contrary, we find, even in the West, many scholars of the opinion that India has reached the greatest of speculative heights and can be proud of philosophers of the keenest analytical skill. It is true that this opinion as expressed by some Indians is dogmatic rather than a result of

serious consideration. And the unwillingness of some ordinary enthusiasts may be due not only to a want of a thorough and sympathetic grasp of the Western systems, but also to mere prejudice. And this prejudice is ultimately nothing but the fear of being shown its weakness, assumed or real. The Christian is prejudiced against the heathen, the Jew against the Gentile; so is the Hindu against the Mlechcha. In each case the former is nowadays very sensitive to any criticism by the latter. But in this twentieth century, when a rational and sympathetic understanding of all religions and philosophies is nearly accomplished, this sensitiveness is a tacit and unconscious admission of weakness, and the prejudice is practically the fear of its disclosure. If so, it is again the outcome of the sense of inferiority, hidden in the innermost depths of the mind.

As the objectors to comparative philosophy contend, comparison may lead to some misrepresentation. Similarities may occur in very divergent systems with quite opposite standpoints. And this fact may be the source of some misrepresentation and misunderstanding. For example, one may

* The word is used in the very general sense of a comparative study of philosophy.

compare Spinoza's Substance with Sankara's Brahman. But the astonishing and fundamental difference between the two is the difference in their methods. Spinoza's geometrical method never could have been endorsed by Sankara. Spinoza's Substance, like Sankara's Brahman, transcends discursive thought. But the former does not notice the inconsistency in the attempt to deduce the phenomenal world from what transcends our discursive thought. And the importance which Spinoza assigns to the deductive method becomes quite obvious, the moment one opens his *Ethics*. But such a deduction could never have been conceived by Sankara. His method is a consuming dialectic, the principle of which, again, may be compared, without any limitation, to the principle of coherence or non-contradiction of Bradley and Bosanquet. But this again would be a misrepresentation, for the principle has only a negative significance in the metaphysics of Sankara, whereas it is positively significant in the theories of Bradley and Bosanquet. The Absolute of the latter two is a coherent whole, but coherence cannot be attributed to the Brahman of the former, though it is not incoherent. These differences can be traced ultimately to the difference in their standpoints and conceptions of philosophy—which, however, cannot be described here for want of space.

Yet these objections do not

prove that comparison itself would be misleading. They only show that it is difficult, not that it is impossible. *Comparison should be between system and system, but not between concept and concept.* Even comparison between concept and concept, if it is to be thorough, should lead to the comparison of systems—which means that the concepts are taken with all the significance they derive from the peculiar contexts. Only such comparison can have metaphysical value.

This requirement makes the task very difficult. For when two systems are compared, problems may be found in the one which are not at all present in the other. For example, some Western scholars have pointed to the fact that most of our metaphysical systems are indifferent to ethics.* It is true, the ethical problem did not present itself to our ancients as it did to most of the Westerners. To the former the ethical code was subservient to religion, whereas to the latter ethics required an absolute justification for its being. Yet our systems could have formulated a theory of morality, even admitting its subservience to a higher ideal. And there is no reason why we, who inherit them, should not perform the task. In doing this, we may come across very valuable principles, the importance of which might have been so far unrecognised, or we may even find certain inconsistencies that might have been left unnoticed. If attempts

* For example, Prof. McKenzie is of the opinion that Indian ethics are unphilosophical. See Hopkins: *Ethics of India*.

are made to remove the inconsistencies, and to develop upon the discovered principles, new roads to progress will certainly be opened.

The view that we should not refer to any Western philosopher in expounding our systems, lest we misinterpret, though it reveals an extremely cautious mind, is not in harmony with the spirit of our times and is indifferent to their needs. This is the time when the peoples of the earth want to understand each other fully without any misapprehension, and this spirit is seen not only in politics but also in every other branch of life. To avoid misunderstanding, to bring home to others that our philosophy is as living as theirs, there could be no better way than comparison. The rationality of our systems and the presence in them of elements of universal interest, could be exhibited best by this method. This would be useful not only in making others understand us but also in finding out what is living and what is dead in our philosophies. The scientific spirit has penetrated our country like many other parts of the globe. Its inquisitive attitude first resulted in calling in question everything ancient and accepted on authority. The first fruit of modern education was a distrust of our dharma, our Vedas, and our philosophies. But later, when Western scholars, like Max Müller, demonstrated their worth through a comparative study, there was a recoil from the extreme of absolute disbelief. Yet to regard Indian philosophy as beyond reach of comparison, and

comparison as compromising its greatness, is to forget the pitiable state out of which it has been lifted, and is the opposite extreme to be avoided. It is only comparative study that has recognised its value, and that can spread its influence and win for it universal recognition. Though every system of philosophy, like poetry, is tinged with the peculiarities of the environment in which it is born, yet, if it is truly rational, it does not fail to contain in it factors which would make it a world-philosophy.

Besides, we have a hoary past, and so possess an individuality that is showing symptoms of becoming inflexible. Nations that have no past, and so no independent culture, are very susceptible to every change, because this individuality is still in the process of formation, and does not yet show signs of ossification. Once formed, it too begins to resist every modification and every incorporation of new elements. And an individuality that is agile and full of life, and therefore progressive, never shows any recalcitrance in assimilating anything new and dropping everything outworn. If our individuality is to continue as a living force it must be able not only to preserve the vital elements of the past, but also to assimilate new elements from outside. To know what is necessary to incorporate from outside, we must completely understand the nature of our individuality. Its peculiarity can never be fully grasped unless we compare it with

others. Our philosophy is its best expression. The value of its comparison, therefore, with other philosophies should not be disputed.

It has been said above that comparison between system and system would occasion new syntheses through the discovery of valuable principles or ignored inconsistencies. This progressive thought will certainly not be a mere colligation of similarities. Nor can all similarities be valuable. The atomism of the Nyaya-Vaiseshika may resemble the atomism of Democritus. But neither can be of scientific value now. And the most important contribution of the Nyaya-Vaiseshika to philosophy, we may say, is its logical theory. But to such an abstract level Democritus could not rise. Only in Plato and Aristotle, who lived long after Democritus, do we find real contributions to logic. So the similarity found in these pluralists cannot enable us to say much about the minds of the philosophers, or about the environments in which the two philosophies were born.

Even a grouping of valuable similarities cannot be a philosophy. For philosophy is a consistent and connected expression, and a mere aggregate of statements cannot lay claim to the title of philosophy. Properly speaking, there is no philosophy which is comparative philosophy, just as there is no religion which is comparative religion. There is only a comparative study of philosophy just like

the comparative study of religion. This progressive thought would therefore be an ever renewing systematisation, which includes all presented facts and yet transcends them. It is claimed by Kant that he has reconciled rationalism with empiricism and transcended both. He could do so only by comparing them. He did not stop with finding out what is true or false in both, but brought together what is valuable in both, and gave the combination a new shape. And in the attempt he brought about what he called the Copernican revolution in philosophy. Such is the nature of every important advance in thought. Every systematisation adds to the facts systematised a new quality which the facts by themselves do not possess. Prof. Radhakrishnan said in the sixth International Congress of Philosophy that the philosopher looks not only backwards, but also forwards, whereas Hegel remarks that the owl of Minerva does not start on its flight until the evening shades of twilight begin to fall. So the former, unlike many philosophers, seems to be more sanguine, for to him philosophy is not merely a systematic survey of what already has been accomplished but also creative.

No attempt is made here to deal in detail with any of the methods and results of comparative philosophy. This paper expresses only the writer's reactions to the attitude of some towards comparative philosophy in India.

P. T. RAJU

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES OF THE PROPHET OF ISLAM.

[Abnormal experiences are neither miracles, nor are they super-natural. Miracles are but the results of the operation of forces at present unknown to science but not unknowable. There is no super-nature, though there is an invisible aspect to Nature. Man as part of Nature also has an invisible aspect. All phenomena called abnormal or religious or psychical or mystical or occult, or by other similar names, are traceable to that invisible and little known aspect.

In the ancient Oriental Esoteric Philosophy, Psychology occupies an important place. It teaches that all human beings who have abnormal experiences are, in the main, of two types—(1) sub-normal and (2) super-normal. The first class is made up of mediums and sensitives; the second of adepts. Mediumship is the opposite of adeptship; the medium is the passive instrument of foreign influences, the adept actively controls himself and all inferior potencies. To put it in another way: there are two kinds of seership—that of the psyche and that of the Nous. The former is the lower type and there is little of consistency and less of enlightenment in the psychic seer; the Noetic Seer, on the contrary, is master of his faculties, as the astronomer is of his telescope.

Almost every religion contains a record of the psychological experiences of its prophet and patriarchs. Sometimes the followers of a particular creed think it irreverent to study, scan and analyse the recorded experiences of their prophet. We think this unfortunate for the cause of knowledge. We therefore welcome this attempt of **Professor M. Aslam** to examine the religious experiences of the Prophet of Arabia, and no one can take exception to the able handling of the subject by one of His own followers. In H. P. Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled* the student of the subject will find adequate explanations of the experiences described and commented upon in this article.—Eps.]

By religious experiences I understand experiences which, different from ordinary sensuous and even intuitive experiences, may be said to constitute evidence of contact between the experients and the Divine Being. The modern interest in such experiences as a key to the study of religion seems wholesome; but this interest, to be fruitful, must be directed to the study of those original experients who have founded religious traditions. Muslims believe that religious personalities have a kinship, that they have anticipated and acknowledged one another, and that fundamentally the experiences they have had are of the same order as those of their own

Prophet, who used to say, "The Prophets of God are as sons of the same Father." As Muslims owe this belief to their Founder, the latter's own experiences constitute, for them, the very norm of "religious experience"—so that to acquaint ourselves with the experiences of the Prophet is to acquaint ourselves with the experiences of all Prophets and therefore with the heart of religion, as Muslims view it.

There are various kinds of religious experience as we find them in the Prophet. Says the Quran (42: 51):—

And it is not for any mortal that God should speak to him except by *inspiring*, or *from behind a veil*, or by

sending a messenger and revealing by His permission what He pleases; surely He is High, Wise.

This verse lays down three different ways in which God communicates to man:—

1. "Inspiration" or *wahy*, which may be described broadly as intuition. No words are transmitted nor any sights seen which have symbolic significance, but only ideas are communicated and these may later be described or made use of by the recipient;

2. "From behind a veil," which would include (a) dreams which come true, (b) visions which are dreams in a waking or a semi-waking state and (c) verbal inspiration, the words of which, however, are heard from nowhere in particular, or are seen written on a paper presented as in a dream, or are uttered by the recipient involuntarily; and

3. "Revelation" proper, which is recited to the recipient by "an angel" in human form. This form of communication is the rarest in the entire field of religious experience and has been had, according to Islam, by the greatest of religious personalities only, by those called "Prophets" in the Quranic sense.

It is only fair to state that according to Islam all these may be experienced by very ordinary persons, particularly intuitions, true dreams and even visions, but they become signs of divine favour only as they become distinguished by superior quality as well as quantity; as they pertain more and more to matters important to mankind at large; and as they display increasingly the Knowledge, Power and Will of God.

To proceed now to describe the higher forms of the Prophet's experiences—called revelations. Among what may be called their

objective symptoms we find the following:—

1. Symptoms of fear, such as (a) sweating, (b) flushing of the face, and (c) a general sense of awe.

2. Symptoms of bodily relaxation.

3. Symptoms of sleepiness.

On the subjective symptoms of moments of revelation we have the Prophet's own report:—

Revelation comes to me, at times like the ringing of a bell, and this form of revelation is the hardest for me. The sound withdraws, while I have already secured the words which it brought. At other times I am visited by an angel, in human form, and he recites to me so that I am able to remember later what he recites.

An important point to note here is that while verbal revelation as also the appearance of angels is denied by modernists in theology—both Muslim and others—as being at all possible, in the Muslim, as also in non-Muslim records it is presented as the most important and distinctive form of religious experience.

It is verbal revelation which raises the experiences of great religious personalities above the vagueness of those whose influence is less far-reaching, and it is verbal revelation which renders religious experience measurable and therefore fit material for systematic study and evaluation.

How about the content of those revelations? We may state broadly that they were either prophecies about the future or instructions to the Prophet, such as had the effect of training and strengthening his mind. We find in the records numerous cases of revelation which gave the Prophet peeps, as it were,

into the Unseen and the Unknown. On occasion these were readily proved to be valid and true. For instance, a Jewish woman who hated the Prophet invited him to a feast and served him with a poisoned dish. The Prophet refused to eat it, the dish itself declaring that it was poisoned. Later, one of his companions unwittingly ate of the same dish and died. On another occasion, we are told, two emissaries having come to him on behalf of the King of Persia demanded his surrender in the name of their ruler. The Prophet appointed a day for reply and, when the day arrived, told them that his God had killed their king. The men returned stupefied, only to learn that while they were away on this errand the heir apparent had suddenly dethroned and killed his father. Besides these peeps into the Unknown which were tested immediately, his revelations embodied prophecies about the more distant future. Examples are his prophecies about the ultimate triumph of Islam, the spread of its empire and the destruction of its enemies; and often enough these contained specific and numerous details. Examples may also be found in the Prophet's prophecies about himself. One is embodied in a verse of the Quran which was revealed when he was still at Mecca, alone and unassisted. The verse proclaims Muhammad as a Prophet unto mankind and compares him to Moses. This description turned out to be true, and incidentally was in accord with the Old Testament prophecy contained in Deuter-

onomy, XVIII, 18, which foretells the advent of a Prophet like unto Moses from amongst the brethren of the Israelites, that is, the Ishmaelites who were the ancestors of the Prophet.

Prophecies may also be divided, from another point of view, into those which are mere premonitions and those which are not foretellings merely, but embody the Will as well as the Knowledge and the Power of the Divine Personality. Revelation of this kind, which embodied prophecies about events conditioned by other—not apparently connected—events is the most characteristic amongst the religious experiences of the Prophet. A convincing example of this kind of prophecy relates to the date when the wrath of God was to visit the Meccans who had treated him so cruelly and had derided his claims to being their teacher. The prophecy said that disasters would come to the Meccans as soon as the Prophet went away from amongst them. We know from history that the troubles of the Meccans, which included a severe famine, began with the Hejira, that is, the departure of the Prophet.

If we treat the various classes of experiences so far described as experiences which are only moments in a long life, how are we to have any idea of the life of the Prophet as a whole, manifesting the quality and the degree of the contact which he claimed he had with the Divine Personality? A knowledge of this side of the Prophet's experience is to be had from a study of the Prophet's prayers, also of those mo-

ments, which were very many, during which he showed a terrible certainty about God. It is said that he was God-mad and when he prayed he was so overcome by the Divine Presence that he wept. There are many incidents which show how great and unfailing was his faith in the protection and presence of God. One of the best known is the incident of the Cave Thor in which he and his bosom companion Abu Bakr were closeted together for three of the most terrible days of his life. At one moment the clatter of his pursuers was heard clearly. Their feet were visible when Abu Bakr, overcome by fear, said "If they but bowed a little they would find us." The Prophet replied, "Stop, O Abu Bakr! You think we are two. We are not two. There is a Third and that is Allah."

Tradition has also recorded, very much as in the case of other religious personalities, certain experiences which appear quite extraordinary and unconvincing. As one notable example, I may mention the *Miraj* or the alleged ascension of the Prophet in the course of a night to the heavens and his return to the place whence he started on his night journey. Popular accounts have greatly exaggerated the original narrative, which clearly states that on the initiation of the "journey" the Prophet's "eye was asleep but his heart [which in Oriental phraseology is frequently equivalent to mind] was awake". The original account also states, between parentheses, that "Prophets while they have their eyes asleep, have their heart awake".

The account closes by saying that "when the Prophet awoke he was resting in the Holy Mosque [of Mecca]". The whole account suggests that the so-called "ascension" was only a vision in a semi-waking state. Thus understood, the experience is no longer so very extraordinary—it can be fitted in with the other experiences of the Prophet.

Once, however, we choose to describe the experience as a vision, we raise the important question of how sights seen in visions and dreams are to be interpreted as species of religious experience. It is well known that the religious literature of all peoples includes what may be called books on the interpretation of dreams. How these books have come into being is an interesting question. My own view is that they have grown with the religious experience of man.

I have described the experiences of the Prophet sympathetically, believing that such a description would be important and interesting. It is true, however, that the experiences, even supposing they took place as here described, raise all kinds of questions. The most pressing, and practically the most interesting, questions which they raise are: Are these experiences valid? Are they true? Are they really evidence of contact with God, as they claim to be?

I cannot answer these questions here, but can only suggest the issues raised. The first is: Was the Prophet sincere in reporting his experiences? This is comparatively easy to settle: Did not the

Prophet produce a whole nation of sincere followers? And was he not in his lifetime surrounded by friends who were embodiments of sincerity? And could such a measure of sincerity be produced except as a response to an equal if not greater sincerity in himself?

But, admitting the Prophet to be sincere, the second issue is: Was the Prophet of sound mind while he had such experiences and also when he reported and interpreted them? Were not these experiences delusions with only a subjective significance, none being outside the Prophet's own chain of experiences?

The Prophet seems to have been well aware of the likelihood of such questions on the nature and value of his experiences. We have repeated denials of all possible interpretations other than the one which the Prophet and his followers put on the experiences, *viz.*, that they were communications from God to man. The Divine origin of these was accepted by him and his followers—and they included some of the most critical,

sincere and intelligent of human beings, many of whom had experiences similar to his.

In modern times, though religious experience is being looked upon with increasing deference, there is still an unwillingness to accord it the value which the experiencers and their followers attach to it. But religious experiences have not been studied in any detail so far, and most of the views—whether of psychologists or others—are coloured by the attempt to find naturalistic explanations of all possible phenomena. If religious experience is not sound, it can only be put down as a form of insanity. And if it is a form of insanity we must answer the question whether any form of insanity is ever correlated—as it was in the case of the Prophet—with an extraordinary power to purify multitudes of human beings, to raise them intellectually, morally and spiritually, to change the course of events in an outstanding way and to foretell events, even the first conditions of which are too distant to be observed.

M. ASLAM

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

SOCIETY AND LITERATURE

[Dr. Ernst Kohn-Bramstedt is a German sociologist as well as an historian of literature. His speciality is the social aspects of European literature. He is now preparing a book on "Class-Distinction, as reflected in German Literature of the Nineteenth Century". According to his view the task of the sociology of literature is on the one hand to get information by the analysis of the social problems involved in literature, and on the other to understand literature by a new approach which examines its social implications.

The prospects of literature producing a world-unity may be, as our distinguished author thinks, remote in spite of the fact that different literatures travel round the globe and receive welcome. But surely, if not the many readers, the authors at least are in a position to further the aim of Goethe with whose words the article closes. Such an international organization as The P. E. N., can contribute, indeed is contributing worthily, by bringing together men and women of all climes and races who wield that weapon which is universally acknowledged as mightier than the sword.—EDS.]

The sociology of literature is a young and growing, but very important science. Histories of German, English, American, Indian and other literatures deal only with the special problems of the literature of each nation. But the sociology of literature is a more general science; it is a branch of the sociology of culture, and as such it endeavours to analyse by a comparative method the literature of all nations and of all periods.

What are the chief problems of the sociology of literature? What is its typical approach? The normal history of literature shows a tendency to isolate literature, considering the authors as individuals or discussing the æsthetic content of their writings. The sociology of literature, without denying the claim of *Æsthetics*, stresses the close connection between literature and society.

Æsthetics deals primarily with the æsthetic equipment of man, particularly with his faculty of imagination. It can find from this starting point a way to understand the characteristics of such literary movements as classicism, romanticism, realism, etc. *The sociology of literature* attempts to consider the production and reception of literature as functions of the social process. Therefore its task must be to examine on the one hand the sociological conditions of the writers and of their work, on the other hand to analyse the reading public and its literary needs. The intermediate link between the analysis of the writer and that of the public is the study of the sociological basis of literary taste.

The sociology of taste would have to state the rôle of many different factors which determine the taste, e.g., race, climate, tradition, social position, influence of profes-

sion, of generation, of religion, special tendencies of certain circles, literary modes, etc. Everybody will agree that the literary taste of a missionary in India is different from that of a trade unionist in Wales or from that of a spoiled elegant lady of Society in London. On the other hand it is evident that a courtly "troubadour" of the Middle Ages was influenced by an æsthetic different from that of a naturalistic writer in the age of industrialism and of the nineteenth-century beginnings of mass democracy, or from that of a fascist author of to-day.

In the following short essay we cannot analyse the interesting correlation between social change and changes of taste, nor can we deal with the problems of the reading public.* We must confine ourselves to making some references to the sociology of the writer and to the analysis of the function of literature in different political systems. Finally, we may sketch the process of reception of one national literature by another country or continent.

From the days of the Greeks and Romans up to the Renaissance there were two main alternatives for the social position of the writer and of the artist in Europe. He might belong by birth to the ruling class, that is to the so-called "leisured class". The members of this class, having a good income and letting the slaves or the serfs work for them, sometimes devoted

themselves to science and poetry. That was the case, for example, with *Æschylus* whose father was a noble landed proprietor, or with *Sophocles*, the son of a well-to-do entrepreneur who employed slaves in his factory. But very often the poet possessed nothing more than his talent as a weapon in the struggle of life. Then he needed a patron and became dependent on the favour of the powerful. The old German bard, the French "troubadour" of the Middle Ages and the Italian poeta laureatus of the Renaissance were all forced to seek the patronage of the court or of the nobility. If the people in power were generous and conciliatory, the poets overloaded them with eulogies and dedications. But if the patrons were sparing in their gifts or if they refused money, the authors often used the whip of satire, and sometimes libel. The famous Persian poet *Firdausi*, for example—whose millenary has just been celebrated—complains bitterly in his great poem "Sháhnáma" of his poverty and of the lack of assistance from the court. Instead of the hoped-for pension which, for example, the outstanding German lyricist *Walter v. der Vogelweide* obtained from his emperor after many disappointments, *Firdausi* received only an insulting gratuity which in all probability he divided between a steward and a beer-vendor. The poet revenged himself by denouncing the Sultan as son of a slave

* A valuable contribution to the study of the English reading public has been recently made by Au. D. LEAVIS, *Fiction and the Reading Public*. But her approach is more that of education of the public than that of sociology.

and as a wretched creature.

The dependence of the poets on the feudal rulers was not without influence on the character of their work. The writers often shared the view of life of the rich and powerful and therefore despised manual labour and did not understand the grievances of the "man in the street".

Art in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was still courtly art and the relation of the artist to the Court remained a vital matter for him. The dependence of the artist on patronage was sometimes a clog on effective writing, but it was on the whole less injurious than the bad effect of the inhibitions of a few poets coming from the ruling class. Goethe with his wonderfully realistic attitude has observed this disturbing influence of high birth on the literary production of Byron.*

In the modern world the publisher has taken the place of the patron. Formerly the author was dependent on the taste of the noble circles, now he often becomes the slave of public opinion which is interpreted by the publisher and by the critic. It is a well-known fact that important books with original ideas and high achievement succeed with much more difficulty than mediocre books. The general idleness of man and the changes of literary fashions favour or hinder the success of books. This is meant by the old Latin proverb: "Habent sua fata libelli." The success of best-sellers and of most popular books brought

about by the propaganda of publishers and Press was delightfully satirised by Arnold Bennett in his novel, *A Great Man*.

There is no doubt that great works, in fiction as well as in non-fiction, need a longer time for elucidating whatever is original in them than ordinary literature. Nobody had any real appreciation of the very fine poems of Hölderlin in the life-time of this unfortunate German. How long had David Hume to wait until he could enjoy the success of his philosophical writings! Similarly, the bulk of the first edition of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea* in 1818 had to be destroyed by the publisher as a result of the lack of public interest. Only thirty years later, after the disappointment of the German bourgeoisie by the failure of the revolution of 1848, there was suddenly a widespread disposition amongst the intelligentsia towards the pessimistic doctrines of this lonely philosopher.

The public can understand new and advanced thought only by a certain attitude of mind, which depends largely on changes in society. This idea brings us to the relation between political systems and literature. The prevailing political system and the social structure which is its basis are perfectly reflected in the literature of their time. For example, in the era of Absolutism the Court circles wielded not only the political power but determined also very widely the criteria of æsthetic appraisal. For this statement—as I

have shown elsewhere*—the distinction between Tragedy and Comedy in the French and German criticism of that period is significant. The sphere of Tragedy, according to this opinion, is the sphere of the refined, the sublime and the majestic. Therefore only persons of high birth and rank, who as such possess these qualities, are allowed to figure in a tragedy, and the canon absolutely forbids the introduction of common people. On the other hand Comedy is the true field for the lower classes, particularly the artisans, since the life of this class is identified with the sphere of the comic and the vulgar. This theory, becoming a kind of superstructure of class distinction, is also, perhaps unconsciously, reflected in the double plot of some Shakespearean plays, especially "Midsummer Night's Dream" and "Much Ado about Nothing". But sometimes Shakespeare's genius caused to mingle in his plays people of different classes, and it is very significant that it was for this reason that one of the most recent of absolute rulers, King Frederick the Great, was disgusted with "Hamlet". He disapproved of it because in it porters and grave-diggers stand beside princes and kings and "make speeches which are worthy of them".

While the liberal system favoured individual discretion to such an extent that it seemed necessary for every member of the upper classes to have a pronounced taste

of his own, modern dictatorships determine directly or indirectly the norms of good and bad taste for all people. In the fascist countries such authors whose work has no positive connection with the ideology of the totalitarian state or with the myth of blood and soil have small chance of acknowledgment or of a wide public. From the standpoint of these governments there are three categories of literature; forbidden books, disliked books and favoured books. Such states prefer on the whole to provide themselves with their own national literature and therefore they select only a few congenial foreigners. In Germany to-day, amongst recent English writers, D. H. Lawrence is most approved, because they hold him a forerunner of Fascism and put him just next to Nietzsche, the great philosopher of power. Similarly, the works of the French poet Giono, which show an outspoken tendency to "regionalism" and to the worship of soil, are widespread in the Germany of to-day. On the other side, the books of Jewish authors now banned in Germany—those of Feuchtwanger and Stefan Zweig, for instance—have been for many years widely read in England.

We cannot deal here in detail with the considerable problems of the reception of the literature of one country by another. But we can give only some reflections on the influence of Indian literature on modern European thought.

Roughly speaking we have to

* See my treatise "Probleme der Literatursoziologie" in "Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung," Vol. VII, Leipzig, 1931.

* T. P. Eckermann, *Conversations with Goethe* (24th February, 1825.)

distinguish three periods in the process of the recognition of Indian culture in Europe. The first at the beginning of modern history, the second in the first part of the nineteenth century and the third in the twentieth century. At the beginning of modern history the Europeans, both as conquerors and as missionaries, brought home fantastic news of the existence of a strange country with eccentric customs and mad cults, with cruel princes and tempting women. This very distant country had for Europeans the attraction of being strange, but it was not so valuable to them as the home countries with their so-called superior civilisation and religion.

The second period, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, saw a much more profound interpretation of the strange phenomenon of Indian literature and wisdom. The influence of the Christian churches had meanwhile decreased and the intelligentsia had realized that Christian metaphysics was no longer absolute. Fr. Schlegel, Heine, Schopenhauer, etc., had a romantic conception of India with her deep spirituality. They loved and idealised India, just as Classicism idealised ancient Greece. The words of Goethe, versified from the Koran* :—

God's very own the Orient !
God's very own the Occident !
The North land and the Southern land
Rest in the quiet of his hand

illustrate very well the widening of the outlook on the world which sprang out of the new study of Oriental literature. On the other

hand Schopenhauer, identifying his philosophy so closely with Buddhism, did not realise the great differences between his pessimism and the religion of Buddha.

After these two periods of naïve depreciation and unlimited assimilation, a more critical understanding of Oriental and especially of Indian literature is characteristic of the twentieth century with its world-wide intercourse. While appreciating the value of the alien culture, this period recognizes the similarities as well as the differences between Indian and European thought. In science the comparative method was applied by Max Weber in his famous *Sociology of Religion* and by Rudolf Otto in his valuable work *Mysticism, East and West* (London 1932). The latter, making a shrewd comparison between the doctrines of the Śankara system and of the German mystic, Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), elucidates the general nature of mysticism and its special characteristics in West and East. In his book *The Way to Philosophy*, the German G. Misch attempts the introduction to the system of Śankara with the declared intention of helping the European reader to widen his outlook on life and to purify it. It is intended to force him on the one hand to give up all prejudices and on the other hand to defend truths which he has so far thought self-evident, but of which he now becomes aware through the contrast with foreign ideas.

But in spite of this fine penetra-

tion of Oriental thought into modern European philosophy, the European novels which have an Indian background are more or less one-sided up to the present, for in such fiction the interpretation of Indian life and religion is a very European one. That is proved by a reading of *Kim* by Rudyard Kipling or of the German story *Siddharta* by Hermann Hesse. Both writers have been in India. Kipling, more an observer than a thinker, more man of action than philosopher, paints the coloured swarm of Indian life with impressionistic sensitiveness and describes many different Indian types. But the character of the Indians and their wisdom remain indeed strange to him. "My experience is that one can never fathom the Oriental mind." In comparison with this "Poet Laureate of English Imperialism" Hesse is more an introvert, showing in his work the religious development of the noble son of a Brahman priest. Just as the mediæval Parsifal has to go through many wrong paths in the world before being able to see the Holy Grail, Siddharta needs the experience of owning property, of voluptuousness and of despair before finding the right attitude towards the world and mankind. After a meeting with Buddha he realizes that the true wisdom is not transferable and, therefore, everybody must find a path of his own to spiritual welfare. This *leitmotiv* of Siddharta's development seems to me to be a typical mark of European individ-

ualism of the Liberal age. No general doctrine, no Yoga can help the man. Although Hesse creates intuitively and vividly the very atmosphere of Indian religion, his philosophy follows more the European than the Eastern tradition.

I would like to conclude an essay which is of necessity merely suggestive with a brief reference to a notion with which Goethe enriched the sociology of literature. World-literature just as world-trade, Goethe thought, could bring together people of various nations.

But in the present era of nationalism and of national self-sufficiency it would be dangerous to identify the existence of world trade and of world-literature with the existence of a real co-operation and integration of the nations of the world. The unity of mankind is to-day more a matter of easy transport and easy communication than a psychological and political matter. The fact that the literature of different nations and cultural units is read all over the world cannot abolish in our time the economic and psychological factors which are the causes of conflict and opposition between nations. But it will be of great value for the literary and the scientific élites in all countries to bear in mind the realistic words of Goethe :—

It cannot be our aim to bring uniformity into the thought of nations, but to make them study each other, understand each other; and if they do not want to love each other, at least they should be mutually tolerant.

ERNST KOHN-BRAMSTEDT

* Goethe, *West-Eastern Divan*. Translated by E. Dowden, p. 5.

TRUTH: PERCEIVED AND INCARNATE*

What, I wonder would be the emotions of a Hindu student upon receiving, say from the Editor of *The Hibbert Journal*, a copy of the Revised Version of the English Bible for review? Responsibility and undeserved honour of the same order has, I feel, been conferred upon me by the Editors of THE ARYAN PATH. The *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* (called *Aranyaka*, as it was taught in the forest—*Aranya*; and because of its large size, *Brihadaranyaka*) is, in the learned Professor Shastri's words:—

the greatest of the Upanishads . . . not only in extent, but also in respect of its substance and theme. It is the greatest Upanishad in the sense that the illimitable, all-embracing, absolute, self-luminous, blissful reality—the *Brhat* or Brahman, identical with *Atman*, constitutes its theme.

Here then we have a book of wisdom whose value to the Eastern mind is only comparable to that which religious experience, history and tradition have given to the Bible in the West.

What is an Upanishad? For the enlightenment of Western ignorance we cannot do better than quote Professor Hiriyanna's explanation as given in his invaluable *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*.

The word generally appears as synonymous with *rahasya* or secret. That should accordingly have been its original meaning. Etymologically the word is equivalent to sitting (*sad*) near by (*upa*) devotedly (*ni*) and in course of time it came to signify the secret instruction imparted at such sittings.

That is perhaps a little more intimate than the definition given by Madame Blavatsky:—

The name "*Upanishads*" is usually translated "*esoteric doctrine*". These treatises form part of the *Sruti* or "*revealed knowledge*," *revelation* in short, and are generally attached to the *Brahmana* portion of the Vedas, as their third division.—*The Secret Doctrine*, I. 269-70.

But to complete our understanding, we need the description given by

Shankara himself on the first page of this commentary.

This knowledge of Brahman is called "*Upanishad*" because it entirely removes this relative world together with its cause from those who betake themselves to this study; for the root "*sad*" prefixed by "*upa*" and "*ni*" means that Books also are called Upanishads as they have the same end in view.

"Sitting near by devotedly." Expressive words. Instantly I am reminded of the words attributed to Jesus: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst." There is the same intense, disinterested drawing together of the few who are devoted to the task of *understanding* and who enjoy a spiritual communion in the quest for the truth. Note that in both cases there is a mystery to be revealed. In the one it is personal and embodied; but none the less a mystery: the revelation of truth to those who seek it with the whole heart. In the other it is impersonal and disembodied; but none the less a mystery which only devotion and whole-hearted application will reveal. To both, this understanding is emphatically not something which can be come by through detached inspection and examination of the phenomenal world. According to modern usage, it is emphatically not "scientific" knowledge which is either promised or desired. That can be had more cheaply at the price of brains. This requires consciousness. The very theme and principal enquiry of the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* lies outside the realm of what is now called scientific knowledge; for it proposes the enlightenment of that which science cannot objectify: the enquiring self itself. Science, being objective or not science, can obviously tell us nothing about this. It cannot reveal the awareness of the experiencing subject to itself: nothing but actual

experience can do this. Therefore the philosophy of religion—and all Indian philosophy is primarily religious, that is its glory—is fundamentally the philosophy of religious experience.

We need to make this point quite clear. It is important to do so because without what is fundamentally religious experience, all philosophy—not only Indian, but all philosophy is meaningless. Philosophy is the enquiry into the nature of existence, and unless there be initial consciousness of existence such as raises "obstinate questionings of the creature," neither the partial nor the complete answers of philosophy can be of the smallest interest. That initial enquiry of self-consciousness is the basis of all religion: philosophy is the answer, the mental abstract of experienced consciousness.

Is not the very thought of wise and experienced men being profoundly moved to enquire together upon the fundamental problems of existence like balm and sunshine to the modern mind, obsessed and harassed by the petty and recurring questions of immediate self-interest? In an age when the thoughts of men move, like their bodies, in ever-changing response to external activity which goads them almost to perpetual movement, is it not consoling even to contemplate the great sages? History itself is too young to know when the sublime Sankara meditated upon the sacred writings telling of the earliest and what perhaps remain the most profound conceptions of God and man; but the mystery which revealed itself to him is here, like a pool of limpid water in which we, thousands of years after, can bathe and be cleansed. Time itself has no power to touch the realisation of that Infinite which, at once by its inclusiveness and its exclusiveness, is only to be meditated as "Not this, not this." For purity of conception, there is nothing like it in the West. And to return to such simple profundity is like entering a forest glade from the heat and din of a modern city.

Not that I, child of the West, can

stay there for ever. To me it seems (and here I speak under correction) that there is a new dialectic to be discovered between Eastern wisdom and Western practice. When the West has worn its religious doctrines to the bare bones of personal anthropology, let it go to school in the East. When the figure of God as an old man in the skies, performing tricks with the round globe of the world like a senile child, has finally been rejected: when science has performed its cleansing function of ridding the West of the material incrustations which have grown about the idea of God, let not the West fall into the grossness of materialism, starving its intuitive faculties, vainly seeking, in the pursuit of restless activity and the flight from itself, spiritual forgetfulness. No, let it turn to the East and rediscover those conceptions of the Absolute which in their intellectual purity are untarnishable by anthropomorphic ideas. There it shall find that innermost peace which its soul so deeply needs—that rejuvenation of faith without which its eye grows dim.

And is the East to remain self-content?

That Indian religion is lacking—despite the clarity of its perception, despite an incontestable finality in its philosophic conclusions to which all religious thought must return as to a fountain head—is to me (and here again I speak under correction) most evident. It is lacking because of its bias towards abstraction. It is overweeningly concerned with the intellectual apprehension of truth. Yet the fact remains that for the purpose of this mortal life, the perception of truth is of itself insufficient. To me it seems that India has yet to learn from the West the meaning of Incarnation. For, unless I embody the truth in word and act, Truth may exist in its sublime perfection, unimpaired and even perceived; yet something is lacking in me. Until this Truth becomes incarnate power, man's existence remains unjustified and unjustifiable. Indeed, only where he is *not* can perfection remain

* *The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad with the commentary of Shankaracharya*. Translated by SWAMI MADHAVNANDA. Introduction by Prof. S. Kuppaswami Shastri. (Advalta Ashrama, Mayavati, Almora, Himalayas. Rs. 6.).

truly unimpaired; and hence creep in the perverse doctrines of nihilism. On the other hand, while we shall agree that the perfection of the all-sufficient "Not this, not this" is the great cardinal necessity without which all our ideas must suffer limitation and insufficiency, let us also agree that the acknowledgment *may* be no more than the effort of a detached and abstract mind to postulate what is in essence no more than a mathematical hypothesis. And to such a point of abstraction we shall inevitably be led if we scorn the simple teaching of the heart. Love for this Infinite is needed if its reality is to remain vital even to the mind. And if we admit this love, welcome it and endure its effects in us, something happens. Love is no sooner active than the process of incarnation begins. From this we must not shrink, though the process involve limitation, constriction and departure from perfection. Loss is inevitable; for the process itself is anthropomorphic in intent. But then, so is life in the physical body; and, for the purpose of mortal life, truth which is literally unbecoming to a human body is actually irrelevant. As our Western poet Blake has expressed it: "God becomes as we are, that we may be as he is." And again:—

God appears, and God is Light
To those poor souls who dwell in night;
But does a Human Form display
To those who dwell in realms of day.

The Coming of Karuna. By RANJEE G. SHAHANI, with an Appreciation by Havelock Ellis. ("The Wisdom of the East" Series. John Murray, London. 2s. 6d.)

This is a record of a spiritual adventure. It has its charm and the author is in earnest and is not without scholarship. The book shows how one realm of knowledge melts into the other, and how science and poetry, philosophy and painting, ethics and architecture, mathematics and music, are but the multitudinous expressions

The *statement* of truth is poetry: nothing else is sufficiently inclusive to embrace the truth. So the original Upanishads are poetry in essence: mystic words that await the keys of experience for their unlocking. Their appeal is to experience—not, ultimately to any "philosophic conclusion that may be reached by the proper use of logic and dialectics". Persistently we need to emphasise this, or the rational intellect will drag us from the heights of pure perception to the market square of broiling verbal argument. The reference is always to truth perceived; for there is no other valid point of reference. Even the great Sankara must be kept in his place as commentator; for should his exegesis be treated as oracular, error has already begun to creep in. The temptation of philosophy is to pride of intellect. The only humiliator of this pride is continuous experience. Before that, we must be humble. And in our humility, experience will be procreant.

It is completely beyond the scope of my capacity either to praise or to criticise this Book of the Ancient Wisdom. I can only be grateful to the translator, and hope—that I do not know—that the translation is measurably worthy of the original. The preface by Professor Shastri is a model of compact and instructive eulogy.

MAX PLOWMAN

of the one, vast, creative vision of man.

In the chapter "A Theory of Poetry," the author discusses various views. To him poetry is the interpretation of Nature by an intuition of beauty. In the following chapters, especially, "In Communion with the Sphinx" and "Truth and Reality," he traces the history of science and defines its scope. He has also drawn our attention to the barrenness of pragmatism, the futility of reason, and the limitations of the specialists who have only a lop-

sided view of things and are blind to other values and experiences of life. But he has an infinite faith in the power and potency of love and builds his trust on the transcendent intuition of the mystic, an intuition which sees "a world in a grain of sand, and a heaven in a wild flower".

One is tempted to fall into line with his thinking that life is an "interminable" adventure in an ever-widening region of knowledge, and offers endless scope for speculation and exploration. The baffling sense of mystery gives our life savour and significance; else it would be a prison-house from which

there would be absolutely no escape.

The author, however, in his zeal to extol intuition, fulminates against the intellect, and calls it the "Devil himself". But intuition is not opposed to reason; perhaps intuition is the fulfilment of reason in her most exalted mood. Secondly, the innocence of childhood glorified by a Jesus, cannot refer to that of an ordinary child who shares the instinctive life with the rest of the animal kingdom; but can refer only to that of the other childhood reached by man through the travail of a birth in consciousness.

R. S. DESIKAN.

Ask The Spirits: A Symposium. Edited by DAVID GOW. (Rider & Co., London. 5s.)

A book heralded as "a remarkable collection of all the greatest communications which claim to have come from the spirit-world" naturally raises high expectations; and the volume really is so much better than the common run of psychic communications that it chokes the fancy to conceive the cloud of chaff raised by the winnowing. But throughout one feels the lack of synthesis.

There are fewer pious platitudes than one looks for in mediumistic utterances, though many of the communications are marred by emotionalism and sentimentality. Crude and childish notions stand side by side with isolated philosophical views. Orthodoxy rubs shoulders with the repudiation of dogmatism. Some selections have a lofty concept of an impersonal Deity; others as anthropomorphic a God as any the churches portray. Some of the after-death conditions described are little, if any, less material than the orthodox heaven of Muslims and Christians. There is striking lack of agreement about such fundamental questions as whether the soul reincarnates. Some deny it flatly; some profess ignorance; some affirm it positively.

The diction is generally unexceptionable if also undistinguished. There

are a very few bits of writing which would be a credit to a prose anthology, but they are offset by jarring solecisms in other excerpts, which the explanation that the book is meant for popular reading does not quite excuse. From a literary standpoint the symposium as a whole is not quite commonplace, though in quality distinctly below collections that could be compiled from the output of authors in our midst.

Must we assume the average intelligence among departed souls is lower than among the living? If retrogression is the price of soul survival, surely it comes too high. Perchance the dead have been unfortunate in their choice of spokesmen? Or shall we accept the Editor's explanation that "in the course of their evolution they pass at last beyond all mundane interests and attractions into higher states of being where *direct* communication with the people of earth is no longer possible"? (p. 16)

None of these extracts go to prove that the spirit of the departed has returned to give the messages. But to question their source is not to impugn the good faith of the mediums concerned or of those who accept them at face value, but only to suggest that, as to the nature of the communicating intelligences, the Spiritualists have not proved their case.

Ph. D.

The Way and Its Power: A Study of the Tao Tê Ching and Its Place in Chinese Thought. By ARTHUR WALEY. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

The *Tao Tê Ching* has suffered more translation, I suppose—and perhaps more in translation—by different hands than any work in the world except the Bible. Casting back, I can call to mind no fewer than twenty-eight versions, of which fourteen are English and the rest German, French and Italian. There may be others for aught I know. What is the reason for this spate of translations, and can there be any justification for a new one?

The answer to the first question is that the *Tao Tê Ching* is a short mystical treatise, full of paradoxes and pregnant with thought only half-expressed, written not merely in a language totally devoid of grammatical inflexions but in a style which for sheer terseness surely never had its equal. Such a work, it is clear, must afford scope for great diversity of interpretation; indeed, sometimes one can hardly believe that the various translations derive from one and the same text. A person of keen imagination will read into the words more than they can comfortably bear, while a more matter-of-fact mind may even be inclined to reject as nonsense all but the more practical sayings. Mr. Waley cannot fairly be classed either as an idealist or as a pragmatist, but he thinks that a new translation is needed because the work has never yet been approached from the proper angle. Incidentally, he draws a curious distinction between "historical" and "scriptural" translations. The former "set out to discover what such books meant to start with," the latter "aim only at telling the reader what such a text means to those who use it to-day". Of the *Tao Tê Ching* no "historical" translation exists, and this is the gap which his book is intended to fill. The distinction seems to me unsound, not to say meaningless; for surely it is, or

should be, the aim of every translator to tell us what the author had in his mind at the time of writing. He may fall far short of success, but in that case he has produced simply a bad or indifferent, not a "scriptural" translation.

However this may be, Mr. Waley contends that all previous attempts to get at the real meaning of the *Tao Tê Ching* have failed because it was envisaged as a work of the sixth instead of the third century B.C. This is not a new discovery: fifty years ago it was argued at length in the old *China Review* that the book as it stands could not possibly have been written by a philosopher, either Lao Tzu or another, who was born in the year 604 B. C. But it was still generally believed (except by those iconoclasts who would dismiss it as a forgery of the Han dynasty) to have been anterior to the writings of Chung Tzu and Lieh Tzu; such a jumble of disconnected sayings, it was felt, could hardly have been compiled after the appearance of those far more elaborate treatises. But Mr. Waley will have none of this. In his opinion, there is unmistakable internal evidence that the book was produced about 240 B.C. by "an anonymous Quietist". It is "an extremely polemical work, directed in the main against the Realists, but at the same time siding with them in their condemnation of Confucianism and of the doctrines of Yang Chu." And again: "It is a controversial work, and the opponents with which it deals did not exist till the 3rd century [B. C.]." He sees in it "a continual use of phrases, metaphors and topics" derived from contemporary philosophers, and he also cites the linguistic tests recently applied to its verse portions by Professor Karlgren. But it is "above all the point of evolution reached by the ideas alluded to in the book that makes its date certain beyond any doubt". This is perhaps too strongly put. One of the tests suggested by Mr. Waley really seems to tell against his own theory. The

hsien or "immortals" of later Taoism are foreshadowed in a certain passage of Chuang Tzu, but first actually mentioned in Lieh Tzu, where they are mysterious people who live in a far-off land. It is only in the Han dynasty that the achievement of hsienship becomes the all-absorbing aim of Taoist asceticism. Now, in the *Tao Tê Ching* there is no mention of *hsien* at all. Surely the inference, if any, is that this work belongs to an earlier period than the book of Lieh Tzu, which is now placed in the second half of the third century B. C.

Altogether, Mr. Waley's introduction is so full of stimulating thought and original ideas that he need not have apologized for its taking up more than half the book. I have only room to quote one out of his many penetrating remarks:—

The *Tao Tê Ching* is not in intention (though any one may treat it as such, if he so chooses) a way of life for ordinary people. It is a description of how the Sage through the practice of Tao acquires the power of ruling without being known to rule.

After this brilliant introduction, the translation itself cannot but cause a little disappointment. All the epigrammatic terseness we associate with Lao Tzu has evaporated, and even his famous paradoxes sound rather tame and flat. "That the yielding conquers the resistant and the soft conquers the

hard is a fact known by all men, yet utilized by none." To me, this is by no means an improvement on a much older version: "The soft overcomes the hard; the weak overcomes the strong. There is no one in the world but knows this truth, and no one who can put it into practice." That elegance should be sacrificed to accuracy is excusable; but in too many passages an impossible construction is placed on the Chinese, as in Chapter 2: "The myriad creatures are worked upon by him [the Sage]; he does not disown them." This should be: "All things in Nature come forth, and he does not reject them."

Although the author denies that his book is addressed exclusively to a small class of specialists, its subtler points can only be relished by those who know some Chinese and are familiar with the problems raised by the early schools of Chinese philosophy. In fact, Mr. Waley seems to fall between two stools; for while the general reader may find the discussion of Chinese ethical terms rather dull, the serious student will not be satisfied with the meagre allowance of Chinese characters supplied in the brief Textual Notes. It is the book of a scholar, but lacking the full scholarly apparatus which should have accompanied it.

LIONEL GILES.

The Holy Mountain. By BHAGWAN SHRI HAMSA. Translated by Sri Purohit Swami from the Marathi, with an introduction by W. B. Yeats—and three photographic illustrations. (Faber & Faber, London. 8s. 6d.)

This is a rather disappointing book. It is an account of his travel experiences by the author, a sadhu, who undertook in 1908 a pilgrimage to Lake Manasarovar and Mount Kailash in Tibet. He also tells of a Mahatma he found living without food or clothing in a cave of the sacred mountain and of a vision of the God Dattatreya who materialised in front of him at Gauri-

kunda, a lake near Kailash, and gave him sanyasa.

All this is quite interesting but it is a little difficult to see quite who will profit by the recital. The travel notes, which fill the greater part of the book, are detailed and should be of service to future pilgrims but the supernormal part, the account of the Mahatma and Dattatreya, rather falls between two stools. Those readers who are disposed to be sceptical of such things will not find here any evidence calculated to disturb their scepticism while those, on the other hand, who are aware of the existence of real Mahat-

mas (whether on Kailash or elsewhere is of no importance), are apt to attach more value to their teachings than to mere descriptions of their physical appearance and so will not profit much either, since no effort is made in this book to give any account of the teachings given by either of these personages. The Mahatma, in particular, discoursed on yoga for about six hours but all we are told is that "it is impossible to describe, even meagrely, the nature of our conversations during the three days". Disappointing!

There are one or two inaccuracies. The height of Kailash is given as 30,000 feet but actually it is not more than about 22,000 feet. And who told the publishers the cock and bull story that appears on the dust-cover, namely, that Kailash is visited only by "Hindu adepts who have attained a very high

stage of spiritual development"? The pilgrimage to Kailash is performed by quite a number of people every year, passing within a few miles from this place.* To say nothing of English officials such as Mr. Rutledge, one of whose excellent photos of Kailash adorns the book, the Maharaja and Maharani of Mysore went there only a year or two ago, and many quite ordinary folk make the pilgrimage every year though the journey is certainly arduous.

There is an introduction by the poet Yeats which, however, does not seem to call for much comment. His very readable small-talk about yoga hardly fills the gap left by the absence of the Mahatma's teachings. Incidentally, "Philaus" on page 40 should surely be "Philolaos".

SRI KRISHNA PREM

The New Testament, Vol. I. Edited by M. R. James, O. M.; assisted by Delia Lyttleton; Engravings by Eric Gill. (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 5s.)

A review of the New Testament obviously would be as impertinent as it would be impossible, so we can only note the scope of this present edition in modern typographical dress. Says the book jacket:—

The text is the Authorized Version, unaltered as to wording, but set in straightforward form: the poetry as poetry, the prose as ordinary prose paragraphs. There are no marginal references; the verse numbers occur only at the top of the page. . . . There is also an appendix containing more accurate translations where those of the Authorized Version are misleading or in error.

We have purposely omitted from this quotation the words "the type is large, clear, and beautiful," because we prefer to say this ourselves as a spontaneous tribute. In this first volume we have the Gospels of St.

Matthew and St. Mark, and three subsequent volumes will complete the work. Dr. James in his introduction tells us that "the present effort is to enlist both artistic skill and scholarship in the service of the scriptures as a whole". The engravings by Mr. Eric Gill are interesting.

The New Testament with the authorized text still unaltered but presented in a more modern dress may reach—we hope it will—many of the younger generation who have not been brought up on the Bible as their elders have been. The Bible, with its chapters, its verses, its marginal references, might alarm—perhaps worse still, might irritate—them. This elegant little volume cannot possibly do that, and therefore its readers may be persuaded to give some ear to the ethical message of the Gospels and, having listened, perchance to put them into practice.

T. L. C.

*The reviewer lives at a high altitude in the Himalayas and is one of the few Englishmen who has become a sannyasi and is esteemed highly for his sincerity and earnestness.—Eds.

Must Philosophers Disagree? and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. By F. C. S. SCHILLER. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, the uncrowned prince of the philosophy of Pragmatism, has brought together twenty-four essays in a delightful volume under the intriguing title "Must Philosophers Disagree?"—and the essays relate to educational, historical, and speculative subjects. Dr. Schiller's remarks on "The Psychology of Examinations," intended to "instruct and elevate," neither instruct nor elevate me. Perhaps the fault is mine. Notwithstanding their defects and drawbacks, examinations are bound to continue as a permanent factor of the cosmos as long as human nature continues to be what it is. Sanskritists call examinations "Pareeksha". (Vidya-pareeksha-Vadi-prativadi-samabala-pareeksha, *et hoc*). In the "historical" section Dr. Schiller gives a moving account of his guru, William James, and his Pragmatism, but it is however the "speculative" part which is the most significant in the volume under notice.

Dr. Schiller discusses "Pragmatism, Humanism, and Religion" in the twenty-third chapter (p. 307). It is not at all difficult to understand the pragmatic doctrine that truth is that which is good, useful, and has been tested in the light of the consequences engendered. This view of truth must colour pragmatic morality and religion, ethics and metaphysics. Religion, as Dr. Schiller would have it, is "the soul's aspiration towards an ideal wherewith to rectify and transfigure the actual" (p. 312). The Religion of the Vedanta on the other hand is a rationally rectified attitude to the Supreme Being which is the Author of the Cosmos and Cosmic determinations; prayerful devotion and the fashioning of conduct in relation to one's fellow-men under the dynamic urge of that attitude is practical Ethics. What is the ideal? What sort of rectification or transfiguration is intended by Dr.

Schiller? There is hardly any indication at all. The ideal may be democracy, the era of which according to Dr. Schiller "is ending" (p. 279). The ideal may, on the contrary be the autocracy of Hitler or the dictatorship or autocracy of Mussolini. The methods of rectification or transfiguration may be anywhere between a summary order to quit served on inconvenient individuals and downright shooting. If all such phenomena are to be described as religious and if the objective signified by them as religion, Vedanta and Humanism must for ever remain strangers. While the Vedanta does not at all belittle the value and worth of social service programmes and reconstructive schemes contemplated by the most humanistic of humanistic world-views, there is yet a more spiritually exalted ideal which it seeks to emphasize. Supposing for the sake of argument that by means of a practical application on a cosmic scale of a network of humanistic programmes, every individual is humanized, civilized and enriched, does it mean that one's spiritual destiny is guaranteed? Not at all. Maitreyi made the same query. Yajnyavalkya replied that if the entire universe were filled with wealth, even then no guarantee of immortality could be given (Vitten-amritatvasya-na-aasa-asti).

An exalted spiritual destiny is the birthright of every individual according to the Vedanta. Freedom from the recurring cycles of births and deaths and realization of the immanence of the Supreme Maker constitute *the Ideal*. An aspirant should himself strive to realize that ideal. He or she should endeavour his or her utmost to enable others to realize it; for all are God's children.

The pragmatic or humanistic criterion of utility in the light of which every transaction has to be tested is bound to break down sooner or later. Shooting down of one's opponents has its utility, so also the lynching of Negroes! (During the latest American elections, it is reported that

Negroes who went to record their votes were brutally assaulted.) In fact, provided a certain amount of adroitness and impudence be granted,—there seems to be no course of conduct individual or collective that may not be justified in the light of the utility criterion. A comfortable existence and the membership of ordered civilized society are the motive-forces of Humanism. The goal of an ideal and the rectification of the actual in the light of that ideal are devoid of moral and spiritual sanction, as any ideal could be justified in the light of the utility-criterion. Dr. Schiller's ideals and their rectifications or transfigurations are mere weariness of the flesh so long as humanity is caught up in the meshes of transmigration. The humanistic ideal will pale into insignificance in the lustre of the Vedantic. I do not however expect that Dr. Schiller would readily concede the claims of the Vedanta. It may perhaps interest him to learn that just as the forces of Monism and Absolutism are striving to stifle humanism and pragmatism, in the history of Indian Philosophy the same forces stood arrayed against the radical realism, pluralism, and humanism of Madhva (Purnaprajnya).

Dr. Schiller delivers himself of a delightful disclaimer. He writes:—"Humanism is not a religion, nor even a philosophy of religion . . . nor a metaphysic" (p. 313). James—his guru—on the other hand emphatically implies that humanism is both religion and metaphysics. James says in *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 125: ". . . I myself read humanism *theistically and pluralistically*" (italics mine). Dr. Schiller may perhaps explain this inconsistency away, but I do not see why humanism should be restricted just to theory of knowledge.

I may as well conclude with an

examination of Dr. Schiller's answer to the intriguing query: *Must* philosophers disagree? He seems to think that philosophers must "agree to differ" (p. 14). Sciences methodologically abstract their subject matter for study. This abstraction ensures agreement among scientists. Philosophy on the contrary is a synoptic view of the Whole, the special virtue of which is the toleration of difference. Let me give the Vedantic answer. The answer would be a counter query: Should philosophers agree at all? They need not. As a matter of fact they would not.

The Vedanta is theory as well as practice stern and rigorous. Each philosopher, each system-builder, according to the light vouchsafed him by the Supreme Maker develops a world-view and a programme of conduct fitting with it. Vedanta is grounded on *Adhikara* (fitness or eligibility). The conflict between the fit and the unfit, or mal-fit, or misfit, between the eligible and the ineligible, is a persistent fact of life. Philosophers are the open champions of this conflict. Conflict redounds to the glory of the Lord as much as Harmony. It must be obvious the conflict is only on the academic level. It is confined to doctrine. It does not touch conduct. It does not in the least affect personal spiritual realization. The Vedanta welcomes all conflict and disagreement as a sign of vitality and virility. I am conscious of having exceeded long ago the limit set by the Editors to this notice. If the humanism of William James and Dr. Schiller is administered with a Vedantic re-orientation, and if the revitalized humanism be made the sole guide in daily conduct, war drums would no longer throb and Earth itself would be Paradise. For, the humanistic path is the Vedantic path which is the Aryan Path.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA.

The Hindu Conception of the Deity. By BHARATAN KUMARAPPA, Ph. D. (Luzac & Co., London 12s. 6d.)

This book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the conception of the Deity before the time of Rāmānuja, and the second devoted to an exposition of Rāmānuja's theistic and philosophical system. In each case, the subject has been dealt with fully and clearly from the following standpoints—The Nature of the Deity, Its Relation to the Material World and to the Finite Self.

It may be conceded that the Upanishads adhere strictly to no single type of thought as ordinarily understood, monistic or pluralistic. But, if the view that they "tend finally to an abstract monism such that of Śaṅkara" is questioned by the author, it is as much open to doubt, if not more so, whether in them one would be able to find with him an evolution from abstract monism which represents an earlier view gradually obtaining "its filling from moral and religious sources till in the end it becomes transformed into monism like that of Rāmānuja's" (Preface). Regarding the doctrines of the *Bhagavat Gītā*, the author's explanation is rather ingenious, namely, that they were mainly derived from Ghora Āngirasa who is mentioned in the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* as the teacher of "Krishṇa Devakīputra". *Inter alia*, it is doubtful if this pupil is identical with Śrī Krishṇa. The relationship of the name and deity Nārāyaṇa to Vishnu, given on page 90, may also not be acceptable; while the citation of Farquhar's *Outline* on p. 92 is of no value for the chronology of the Purāṇas. The conception of the Deity according to the *Pāñcharātra* and the evolution of the *Vyūhas* are well traced and dealt with in the next chapter; and the succeeding one is devoted to the Alvēars to whom the aspects that appealed most were "Devotion" "Self-

Surrender" and "Grace." The "Bride and Bridegroom" relationship met with frequently in their hymns means really the state of "Spiritual Marriage," last of the stages which the Mystic has to pass through before his union or merging with the Infinite.

The second part of the book dealing with Rāmānuja is decidedly a better performance. It is mostly an abridgement of the Āchārya's *Śrī* and *Gītā Bhāṣya*, which inculcate the worship of a personal God conceived as Supreme Perfection, characterised by Love and Bliss and by the six attributes, *jñāna* (wisdom), *aīśvarya* (plenty), *śakti* (power), *bala* (strength), *vīrya* (energy), and *teja* (lustre). In this connection it may be mentioned that statements like the following seem to show overmuch the dovetailing of alien ideas into the Vaishṇava system.

"The Deity, then, though transcendent, is not past human grasp." (p. 94)

"The sinner who knows no virtue, and is despised and rejected of men need not fear that he will be rejected by God." (p. 135)

"In spite of the love which the Deity has for the soul, He allows it to do evil, if it so desires." (p. 276)

Throughout the work the wrong idea is repeated, that Śaṅkara's *Māyā-vāda* is opposed to and a bar against ethical and moral progress; that "morality can have no real significance" for Advaitism (p. 284).

The work is based chiefly on translations which, though "accepted," enshrine views some of which could have been revised by a larger and more judicious use of the original texts themselves. References to authorities would have found a better place as foot-notes than in the body of the book. There are several errors in printing and otherwise, but these blemishes notwithstanding, the book of Dr. Kumarappa contains a logical presentation of the relevant texts on religion and philosophy, and makes a useful contribution on the theistic system of Rāmānuja.

S. V. VISWANATHA

The Method of Freedom. By WALTER LIPPMANN. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London. 4s. 6d.)

This is "a tract for the times," by an author, whose brilliant and suggestive works are the common possession of students of Political Science. It consists of a diagnosis of the present world malady, suggestions of remedial measures, and an appraisal of their compatibility with the political situation, particularly in the United States of America.

Mr. Lippmann explores for the causes that "are moving men in their public actions" and have created a "generally revolutionary condition". He finds them in the need for privacy and its destruction in the post-war economy. "It is in the countless realms of privacy that civilization is carried on," but the private life of men is no longer intact or secure, and "the whole organization of men's lives is in confusion". This is because of the contradiction between the national political framework and cosmopolitan economy. Even before the war there was a contradiction between the political independence of the Western peoples and their economic dependence, and this contradiction, for a time smothered under State nationalism during the war, came into greater prominence when the unconscious collaboration of the pre-war economy could not be revived. The suffering and the despair of the people, in conjunction with the consciousness of their power, have made the guarantee of the economic security of the people the central task of Governments.

How are Governments to perform this function? Mr. Lippmann argues that the choice is between the principle of "Absolute Collectivism or Directed Economy" and that of "Free Collectivism or Compensated Economy". The former is to be found in operation in the guise of Communism in Russia and of Fascism in Germany and Italy. Its fundamental defect is that it is based on force, and, therefore, it is self-condemned, since it cannot be re-

conciled with Liberty which "is one of the conditions of human progress".

Accordingly the author advocates Compensated Economy, which combines the virtues of collectivism and freedom, since on the one hand "it acknowledges the obligation of the State for the standard of life and the operation of the economic order as a whole," and on the other, "it preserves within very wide limits the liberty of private transactions". It operates by setting up some kind of compensatory mechanism "to redress the liability to error of free individuals," and illustrations of such mechanism are central banking, and long range planning of public works of all kinds.

But "the compensation method of control requires that the State shall act almost continually contrary to the prevailing opinion in the economic world," and "representative government as it has developed under laissez-faire in most countries is incompatible with a State which accepts responsibility for the economy as a whole". We have to reckon with the diversity of interests, and the presence of pressure groups, which seek to exploit the resources of the State for promotion of their particular interests. "Paradoxically, the Proletariat and the Plutocracy . . . tend to combine in a dangerous union and to dominate the State." Now, if the State will guarantee the right to remunerative work, and thus "go to the base of those disorders which commonly make democracy irresponsible," economic reconstruction and political democracy are easily reconciled.

The doctrine of the right to work is aggressively socialistic, but Mr. Lippmann makes an ingenious attempt to reconcile it with Private Property, the supreme idol of the middle classes, between whom and the Proletariat he is anxious to establish an alliance. The right to work is argued to be "the moral equivalent of the opportunity to stake out private property in virgin territory". Thus Mr. Lippmann seeks

to present a "Socialism without Terrors" to the middle classes; for even though the Proletariat invade the sacred shrines of the twin deities of

Liberty and Private Property, they do so only to join the ranks of the worshippers in common adoration!

N. S. SUBBA RAO

Mother America. By SUDHINDRA BOSE, Ph. D. (M. S. Bhatt, Raopura Baroda, India. Rs. 5)

Mr. Bose can claim authority to write true sketches on America, having lived and travelled there for over a score of years, lecturing in its universities. A short notice defends this book from being a rejoinder to the notorious work of Miss Mayo on India. Our author refers to her in quoting a distinguished American, Dr. Weatherly:—

An enlightened Hindu might come to the United States and make a study of our social life. His book might begin with the account of the chain gangs which exist in southern States and then continue with a plain story of our county jails. He might next turn his attention to our habits of burning people alive for trivial offences against social customs. His next chapter might deal with those fine examples of corruption and graft in the municipal governments of many of our large cities . . . These subjects would by no means limit his field of investigation in the spirit of Miss Mayo. Surely he could tell a sordid and nasty story, but such a picture would not be a picture of America as the intelligent Hindu would recognize as quickly as an intelligent American. A so-called fact out of its relations is not a fact. It is just a lie.

He writes without sentimentality on facts. After rapidly surveying the story of the United States he treats such important topics as its customs, progress, good and evil points, and tries to find their cause. He gives not only his own conclusions but those of prominent Americans. One may be cited. We regret the famous barrister Clarence Darrow has never recognized the Wisdom of Ancient India. Else he could never have said: "Man is an animal whose acts and whose thoughts are as irresponsible, as much coerced into being by circumstances, as the claws of the tiger or the thunder of an avalanche." According to Darrow,

the doctrine of free will is "the crudest superstition that ever afflicted mankind". Dr. Bose continues, speaking of Mr. Darrow's views:—

The so-called sins of men are not crimes, but weaknesses inherent in their being and beyond their power to prevent or overcome. Man cannot separate himself from all the rest of nature. The rules and conditions of his being are fixed and absolute as the revolutions of the planets and the changing seasons of the year . . . Man has will to be sure; but the will is merely the agency of his heredity and his environment. He has little or no choice. The person that we call criminal is so for the same reason that a lion is ferocious and a horse is docile.

This man who, as Dr. Bose says, practises the religion of humanity would find in the study of ancient Eastern philosophy the doctrines of Karma and Reincarnation explaining that man is not the victim of blind fate, but the maker and steady, albeit slow, fashioner of his own destiny who can curb or readjust his tendencies by strong resolve, right effort, and right thought leading to right action.

Dr. Bose has not been glamourised by the West or its much vaunted civilization. He clearly warns Indians that all is not well with their Western brothers and that much reform and change is needed. He is particularly vigorous in his views on Prohibition, opium-trade, and the failure of Christianity, themselves fruits of this very civilization. Readers both in East and West will find much of interest in these pages, while our Indian readers would do well to listen to Dr. Bose's clear warnings against blind acceptance of all that comes from the West. He upholds the honour of India by his insight and by his sense of fair play. The Hindu's motives and methods in dealing with America are gentlemanly.

S. TOWNSEND.

CORRESPONDENCE

CAN SCIENCE DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY?

Would you allow me to make a few remarks on the review of my *Book of Scientific Discovery* which appeared in THE ARYAN PATH of July, 1934, p. 472? Your reviewer states:—

Modern science may appropriately be said to have begun with Roger Bacon, Leonardo, Kepler, Galileo, Harvey, and others. Its method has been as remarkable as its discoveries. But it would be hardly just to claim that these are quite "new," and the past had no idea of them. The past sought the one indivisible Truth through its own approaches while modern science has been seeking it through others.

In the concluding sentence in the passage quoted, the word "science" is surely used in its original meaning of "knowledge," for in its usual meaning nowadays as the systematic study of nature, none of its followers would claim that it seeks the one indivisible Truth. Men of science are content to leave the wider issues to the philosophers while they restrict their field to a description of experience.

Far from claiming any discovery as quite "new," I have been at pains to point out that no scientific discovery is an isolated event but the result of a slow growth having its roots deep in the past. In some cases we have records reaching back through the centuries which enable us to reconstruct the steps leading to a particular discovery. In others, we have no such records and a discovery *so far as our evidence goes* seems to have sprung fully armed from a Jove-like brain. In such instances the historian, though recognizing that the evidence may be incomplete, can work only from the positive records which he can interpret.

As to the question of science and human welfare, surely the results of science, as such, are independent of human values. Whether the results are applied for good, evil or worthless ends depends upon man alone and

hence the very grave responsibility resting upon mankind to-day.

To take a single example. Towards the close of the nineteenth century, chemists succeeded in nitrating phenol and so obtaining picric acid. The method of preparing this substance became part of the equipment of practical chemists all over the world. Then the exploiters of this simple discovery came along. It was found that picric acid could be used as a dye for silk and hence quantities of this compound were produced for the textile trade.

Again, medical men found a solution of picric acid to be a useful reagent for certain physiological tests as well as an invaluable preparation for the treatment of burns and scalds. On the other hand, those whose business in life was destruction rather than healing, found that picric acid was a powerful explosive. Thenceforward picric acid was manufactured on a large scale and used together with other materials for blasting rocks, but far greater quantities were utilized for making explosives for use in war.

Much of what is deplorable about our present-day Western civilization has been due to the greed of the exploiters of scientific discoveries. Our overwhelming need in the West is a re-orientation of thought which shall give an adequate place to those human values which the great leaders in East and West alike have always held before our eyes.

DOROTHY TURNER

Bratislava, Czechoslovakia

REJOINDER BY THE REVIEWER

It is true that the term "Science" is now commonly used in a restricted sense to mean such knowledge as may be amenable to measurement so that any knowledge which does not yet lend itself to measurement has no title to a

domicile in the realm of "Science," though judged by other tests of approved logical worth such knowledge may be quite valid. There are several methods of verification of which the methods of exact measurement harnessed with such remarkable success by the physical sciences, represent a few only. And when it is remembered that the methods of exact science, in proportion as they are expected to yield exactly measurable and calculable results, are applicable to fields of enquiry prepared by "limitation of data" and "paring of irrelevant details" and in accordance with a specially adopted scheme of conventions or "frame of reference" as it is usually called (*e. g.* Space-Time coordinates in Relativity Physics); and when it is remembered further that the bases of calculation are found to involve not only some apparently "brute" facts (*e. g.*, Quantum phenomena) but also some undefined and possibly undefinable entities which have to be admitted as postulates, one cannot but hesitate in accepting the orthodox methods of physical investigation as opening the only safe and sure avenue to Truth.

Some of the other approaches may lead to a vision of Truth less conventional, less dependent on the exigencies of theory, on the limits and accidents of physical observation and experiment and on abstract calculations of what are often only probabilities. A concrete truth, a whole and living truth—a Truth which more clearly and directly shows its affinity with the Good and the Beautiful—is unquestionably of higher worth than one which has been described and measured, but which is yet abstract and conventional, isolated and atomistic, not showing its proper place and function in the organism of the Living Whole. If we use the word "Philosophy" for the pursuit of the Living Whole, the term "Science" should not be restricted only to the field of knowledge—mapped and measured, but abstract, conventional and segregated; it should include any body of knowledge or experience,

verified and verifiable, even though verification and demonstration may have been effected through methods other than those called "laboratory" methods.

Of course those who seek truth by laboratory methods should stick to and persevere in them and jealously guard the results obtained through them. A system of results so obtained may even be allowed to make our "science". But it is to be understood firstly, that this is science only in a restricted and fragmentary sense; secondly, that such science has its limitations, both basic and functional; thirdly, that, therefore, it cannot present us with a view of the Living Whole of Truth; fourthly, that, consequently its results have a tendency to be swayed by a kind of centrifugal impulse, losing their proportion, perspective, and inter-relation and being more and more pulverised and atomised; fifthly, that the unity that it is able to achieve is neither abiding nor fundamental, and, lastly, that not seeking "the one indivisible Truth" and, therefore, not caring to interpret and apply its results in the logic of this Truth, such science risks being divorced not only from philosophy but also from ethics and religion, finding itself on the brink of materialism and agnosticism and offering results which, in some cases, prove diabolical in practical application.

Science should be in a position to concede at least the possibility of there being other methods of seeking the Truth which may be free from some of the inherent and incidental defects of the methods of "positive" science, and give us knowledge which, without being less valid or "demonstrated," may be more in touch not only with the one indivisible Truth but with the eternal Values. This latter science may have to be called spiritual science or by some other name, and its methods may in part be "occult," but all the same it is a science—in the sense we have here conceived it—not only of greater and fuller logical, but of truer

and richer cosmic, value.

Once we grant this richer and more vital science and its methods, we grant that some of what is now "newly" discovered by laboratory methods may have been discovered before by the methods of the other science, and that, in many cases, the modern methods are only bringing up complementary or confirmatory evidence on old findings which, however, were not mere "conjectures". What is needed is certainly not a confounding of the two sciences and their methods, but their co-operation and the co-ordination of their results. Each will seek in the other new bases, corroboration and amplification, and new sources of inspiration. That will obviously mean real gain to both. Physical science will then renew her links with both philosophy and religion, that is, with the higher planes and deeper springs of Life. Physical knowledge—as indeed every knowledge—will then cease to be regarded as "neutral" (it is never so in practice), but will be pursued to the extent it is true, good and beautiful. Where under existing moral conditions of the world a given result runs the risk of being more abused than "utilised" (as in the case of the picric acid), its knowledge should be under a ban, the beneficent uses of that discovery being in that case sought to be achieved by ways less open to abuse. Not all forms of knowledge are good for all ages and persons. Science, both theoretical and applied, physical and spiritual, must be cultivated suitably to the spiritual competency of an age or a group of persons. Some forms and tendencies have to be encouraged, some to be banned.

Some ends (e.g., healing) have in certain cases to be achieved by other means. In one word, Wisdom must lead Science and sanction Art.

PRAMATHANATH MUKHOPADHYAYA
Calcutta

INDIAN CHRISTIAN CHURCH

In your December number Dr. J. M. Kumarappa suggests reforms in the Indian Churches. May I draw his attention to the following from the annual report of the Church Missionary Society:—

Never was evangelism more needed than at present and never was opportunity so great as now.

Does not Dr. Kumarappa think that the first necessary reform is the rejection by the Indian Christians of every denomination of proselytizing foreign missions? And referring to the plan of a Jesus Society, how will its members protect themselves against the intrusion of the missionary element? The poet Tagore only recently said in this very city:—

Even the religious ministers sent by the West to the East have in their sectarian pride emphasised and exaggerated these differences more than any other body of men. They have produced the psychology which makes it comfortably easy for the military and mercantile powers of their community to carry on their mission of degradation in alien countries helplessly open to their inroads.

A striking example of this is just reported. In Washington, D. C., Senator Homer Bone described how the Rev. Paul Young, Christian Alliance Missionary, sold munitions in Ecuador, "tambourine in one hand and gas bomb in the other". I should prefer rank atheists to missionaries—false pietists of bewildered soul.

Madras.

J. E.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

In *The London Critic* Wilfrid Northfield explains that millionaires are unhappy, and he most truly points out that "it is very difficult for the rich man to prevent his material possessions stealing away and submerging his peace of mind". But he concludes that "it is possible that if King George were to search out his happiest subject, he might still find, as in the fable, that the old fellow hadn't any shirt to his back". Then, are beggars happy? In a country like India where ghastly poverty is perpetual, and where the body is not so much respected as the temple of the soul, as regarded as a fetter and a curse, large numbers of the people choose to be beggars by profession and do not hesitate to maim themselves and their children in order to eke out a better income. Greed is a vice not of the rich only but also of the poor. Mr. Northfield further asserts "that the happiest man has neither too much money, nor too little"—but is this true? Are the middle classes in every country happy? If so, then why are they ever striving to gain promotion from the lower middle to the higher middle class, and so onwards? Neither riches nor poverty are makers of happiness. It is the use we make of riches or poverty, self-chosen or not, which is the deciding factor.

Those who merely give up their wealth hoping to escape the burden and responsibility it entails fail to secure real lasting happiness. When a man turns not beggar, but trustee of all he possesses, and uses his wealth for the uplift of all, then it is that he tastes of the satisfaction which creativeness brings. A hoarder of wealth is but a creator of discontent for himself; he who creates with mind and heart, using money as his tool, feels the joy of the altruist which is superior even to the joy experienced by the artist.

But the man of charity has his own problems. The greatest good of the greatest number is a noble principle, but what constitutes "the greatest good"? Although philanthropic institutions and schemes are being brought forward by good and noble men and women, vice, selfishness, brutality, and the resulting misery seem to grow no less. Prisons, asylums for the outcast and the magdalen, can be filled much faster than it is possible to create them. Widespread education and scientific research have produced their own evils. A millionaire, voluntarily or compelled by circumstances to seek avenues of philanthropy, comes upon unexpected "snags". How many times has he not found